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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1993

MICHAEL J. CARPENTER, PETITIONER

v.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENT

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Military Appeals

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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QUESTIONS PRSENTED

1. May the Judge Advocate General of an Armed Force, who is not authorized to make appointments under the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, appoint commissioned officers to serve as military trial and appellate judges, on the theory that their appointment as commissioned officers already satisfies the Appointments Clause for both their judicial and nonjudicial duties, and appoint civilians to serve as military appellate judges?

2. Does the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment require that, in peacetime, military trial and appellate judges be appointed to their judicial offices for fixed terms, and that military appellate judges be assigned to judicial duties as their primary duty?

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PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

The petitioner, Michael J. Carpenter, respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment and opinion of the United States Court of Military Appeals entered in this proceeding.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Military Appeals, *United States v. Carpenter,* 37 M.J. 291 (C.M.A. 1993) is reprinted as Appendix A at App. 1a. The opinion of the United States Coast Guard Court of Military Review, *United States v. Carpenter,* 34 M.J. 681 (C.G.C.M.R. 1992), is reprinted as Appendix B at App. 21a.

The opinion of the United States Court of Military Appeals, *United States v. Weiss,* 36 M.J. 224 (C.M.A. 1992),

cert. granted, __ U.S. __, 113 S. Ct. 2412, 124 L. Ed. 2d 635 (1993), is reprinted as Appendix C at App. 34a.

JURISDICTION

The decision of the Court of Military Appeals was rendered on August 3, 1993. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under Article 67a of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 867a (Supp. II 1990) and 28 U.S.C. § 1259(3) (Supp. II 1990).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES INVOLVED

The Appointments Clause, U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2, Cl. 2, provides:

> The President . . . shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law; but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.

The Fifth Amendment provides:

> No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.

The relevant provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Articles 6, 16, 26, and 66, 10 U.S.C. §§ 806, 816, 826 and 866, are set forth in Appendix D at App. 120a. Rule for Courts-Martial 1002, Manual for Courts-Martial, 1984, is set forth in Appendix E at App. 125a.

STATMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner was a Subsistence Specialist Second Class (E-5), U.S. Coast Guard, at the time of his court-martial. He was tried by a military judge sitting alone as a general court-martial. Contrary to his pleas, he was convicted of various violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). He was sentenced to confinement for fifteen months, reduction to the lowest enlisted pay grade (E-1), and a dishonorable discharge from the Coast Guard.

This petition raises issues important to the military justice system. With respect to the questions presented, the basic issues have been previously raised to, and are to be decided by, this Court in *United States v. Weiss,* 36 M.J. 224 (C.M.A. 1992), *cert. granted,* __ U.S. __, 113 S. Ct. 2412, 124 L. Ed. 2d 635 (1993) (No. 92-1482). This petition adopts and incorporates the same argument as set forth in *Weiss, supra.* In addition, however, with respect to the first question presented this petition presents an additional issue—the appointment by the Judge Advocate General of an Armed Force of civilians to serve as military appellate judges on the service Court of Military Review. Finally, the second question presented involves a related issue concerning the judicial independence of military appellate judges serving on the Coast Guard Court of Military Review as a mere collateral duty.

Like *United States v. Weiss,* this petition raises closely related questions which go to the heart of judicial independence for military trial judges who preside over courts-martial and for military appellate judges who review convictions. All military trial judges and most appellate military judges are commissioned officers and lawyers on active duty in their services. Unlike judges appointed under Article I or Article III, military judges are not appointed by the President with the advice and con-

sent of the Senate. Nor are they appointed by the President alone, the head of a department, or a court of law composed of Article I or III judges. Instead, military judges are selected and appointed by the Judge Advocate General of their service; in this case, the Judge Advocate General is the General Counsel of the Department of Transportation. Art. 1(1), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 801(1) (1988). The General Counsel has delegated most, but not all, of his duties as Judge Advocate General to the Chief Counsel of the Coast Guard, the senior uniformed lawyer of the service. *See* 49 CFR Part 1, Appendix A (1992). The Judge Advocate General is the official for each service who is responsible for the overall supervision of military justice matters. *See* Art. 6(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 806(a) (1988). Moreover, the Judge Advocates General, in concert with other service officials, have absolute and unreviewable discretion to remove or transfer judges out of their judicial assignments, and those judges lack protection if their decisions do not suit their Judge Advocate General. Finally, four of the five judges assigned to the Coast Guard Court of Military Review, including two of the three judges on the panel of the Court that reviewed petitioner's case, serve on that court as a mere collateral duty. All have other, primary duties, for which they are responsible to other officials, including, in some cases, the Chief Counsel. Accordingly, the method of appointment to judicial service in the Armed Forces violates the Appointments Clause; the lack of any fixed term of office, and the service of Court of Military Review judges on a collateral-duty basis, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

1. Institutional Framework

Under Article I of the Constitution, Congress has established a three-tier system of military courts. At the

top is the Court of Military Appeals, which has five civilian judges appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate for fixed terms of office. Art. 142, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 942 (1988). The appointments and tenure of the Court of Military Appeals judges are not at issue.

Below the Court of Military Appeals are four Courts of Military Review; one each for the Army, Air Force, Navy-Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. The Coast Guard Court of Military Review presently consists of five appellate military judges, two of whom are civilians and three of whom are Coast Guard commissioned officers. These judges have been appointed by the Judge Advocate General. Although the Courts of Military Review are permanent courts located in the Washington, D.C., area, none of the judges is appointed to a fixed term of office. Art. 66(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(a) (1988). The Courts of Military Review are typically divided into three-member panels to hear cases; petitioner's case was reviewed by such a three-member panel. Absent waiver by an accused, the Courts of Military Review are required to review all cases in which a death sentence, confinement for one year or more, a dismissal, or a dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge is adjudged. Art. 66(b), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(b) (1988).

Military trial judges preside at special courts-martial, and, if qualified, at general courts-martial. Trial judges must be military officers, all of whom have been appointed as military officers by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. However, their selection and appointment as a judge is normally made by the Judge Advocate General of the service; in the Coast Guard, that authority has been delegated to the Chief Counsel of the Coast Guard. 49 CFR Part 1, App. A, para. 2(3) (1992).

Like appellate military judges, the trial judges have no fixed terms of office. Art. 26(a)-(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 826(a)-(c) (1988).

Each armed force assigns military judges as and when it sees fit. However, a judicial assignment can be terminated at any time through decertification as a judge or by transfer to other, nonjudicial, duties at the discretion of the Judge Advocate General of the judge's armed force.

A court-martial can try any offense committed by a member of the armed services regardless of when or where the offense took place, who the victim was, what was done, or why it was done; the sole requirement for court-martial jurisdiction over the accused is that the accused was on active duty in the military at the time of the offense. *Solorio v. United States,* 483 U.S. 435 (1987). A general court-martial may impose sentences that include death, imprisonment for life or a term of years, total forfeiture of pay and allowances, and a dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge (or a dismissal if the accused is an officer). Art. 18, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 818 (1988). A bad-conduct or dishonorable discharge carries a permanent stigma, and it can have an adverse impact on civilian job opportunities, as well as on certain government-provided benefits. *See United States v. Ohrt,* 28 M.J. 301 (C.M.A. 1989); *United States v. Maharajh,* 28 M.J. 797 (A.F.C.M.R. 1989). Special courts-martial may impose up to six months of confinement, forfeiture of up to two-thirds pay per month for six months, and a bad-conduct discharge. Art. 19, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 819 (1988).

Military trial judges are, for all practical purposes, the equivalent of United States District Judges and Magistrate Judges who preside over criminal trials in federal district courts. The drafters of the Uniform Code of Military Justice wanted military judges to be "real judges" as com-

monly understood in the American legal tradition. *United States v. Graf,* 35 M.J. 450, 465 (1992). The military trial judge has far-ranging discretionary powers, including the power to "rule on all interlocutory questions and all questions of law raised during the court-martial," to "[i]nstruct the members [the jury] on questions of law and procedure which may arise," to "promulgate and enforce rules of court," and to "exercise contempt power." Art. 48, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 848 (1988). If the accused elects a bench trial, a general court-martial judge has even more discretion than does a district judge, because the court-martial trial judge is not bound by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. *See United States v. Brown,* 28 M.J. 470, 474 n. 3 (C.M.A. 1989); *see generally* Manual for Courts-Martial, 1984, Rule for Courts-Martial 1002.

Courts of Military Review exercise all of the traditional powers of appellate courts, including those under the All Writs Act. *See Dettinger v. United States,* 7 M.J. 216 (C.M.A. 1979). Additionally, these courts exercise an "awesome, plenary, *de novo* power of review[.]" *United States v. Cole,* 31 M.J. 270, 272 (C.M.A. 1990). Thus, a court of military review "[m]ay affirm only such findings of guilty and the sentence as it finds correct in law and fact . . .. [I]t may weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, and determine controverted questions of fact[.]" Art. 66(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(c) (1988).

2. Rulings of the Court of Military Appeals

The Court of Military Appeals exercised its discretionary jurisdiction to consider petitioner's claims that the manner in which the trial and appellate military judges in his case were appointed violated the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, and that the service of appellate military judges as a mere collateral duty denied petitioner

liberty without due process. The failure to appoint military trial and appellate judges to fixed terms of office was not specifically addressed in petitioner's case at the Court of Military Appeals; however, the due process violation was present, just as it was in *Weiss*. Several days before it heard argument in *Weiss,* the Court of Military Appeals issued an opinion rejecting the due process claim with respect to fixed terms of office. *United States v. Graf,* 35 M.J. 450 (C.M.A. 1992).[1] Then, on December 24, 1992, a sharply divided court rejected petitioner Weiss's Appointments Clause argument and affirmed the Navy-Marine Corps Court's decision.

In order to garner three votes, the majority in *Weiss* needed two separate and largely inconsistent rationales. Judge Gierke, writing the lead opinion for himself and Judge Cox, agreed that Congress may establish a military justice system, but that Congress cannot declare an exemption for military judges from the Appointments Clause. Therefore, Judge Gierke held that military judges are officers who must be appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause, either by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, by the President alone, by a Head of a Department, or by a Court of Law. App. 41a. This proposition was endorsed by four of the court's five judges. App. 55a, 70a, 111a.

Judge Gierke then held that the Appointments Clause is satisfied when a military officer is commissioned by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, because military judges are simply military officers with legal training. Relying on *Shoemaker v. United States,* 147

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[1] A petition for a writ of *certiorari* in *Graf* was filed on December 29, 1992 (No. 92-1102), and it is incorporated by reference. In the interest of completeness, this petition will summarize the *Graf* decision, as well as the reasons for granting review of the Due Process issue.

U.S. 282 (1893), Judge Gierke first ruled that Congress had not created a "new office" when "Law Officers" became "Military Judges" in the Military Justice Act of 1968, and thus no new appointment was necessary. Alternatively, he concluded that, if a new office had been created, the duties of the military judge were "germane" to those duties already required of a military officer with legal training: "The principle we glean from *Shoemaker* is that Congress may create a new office and give a military officer the duties of that office without making a new appointment necessary, if the duties are germane[.]" App. 40a.

Judge Crawford eschewed the opinion of Judge Gierke, and concurred only in the result. In her view the appointment of military judges need not comply with the Appointments Clause at all because of the special deference given to Congress when it regulates the land and naval forces. Her opinion does not mention *Buckley v. Valeo,* 424 U.S. 1 (1976), in which this Court held that no class or type of officer is excluded from the reach of the Appointments Clause because of the special nature of their office or the plenary power of Congress over the subject area. Additionally, Judge Crawford reached her conclusion even though the Department of Justice (appearing as *amicus* and urging affirmance) disavowed that position in both its brief and at oral argument.

Chief Judge Sullivan and Judge Wiss each filed dissenting opinions rejecting the arguments in both of the majority opinions. The dissenters found no broad exemption to the strictures of the Appointments Clause based on the judges' status as military officers or military lawyers. App. 71a, 109a. Chief Judge Sullivan stressed the watershed events of the Military Justice Act of 1968 which for the first time created a "*professional judiciary*" in the military. App. 93a (emphasis in original). He recognized that what

had occurred was no mere transfer of duties, but was a clear break from past practice by creating the new offices of military trial and appellate judge. Judge Wiss disagreed with the lead opinion's application of *Shoemaker* to this case, in particular its assertion that the assignment of specific and highly responsible judicial duties as a military judge is "germane to some nebulous notion of duties of legally trained military officers in general," that is, to the duties of all judge advocates from which military judges are chosen. App. 118a.

The court did not revisit *Graf* where it had overruled Graf's due process objection to the lack of fixed terms of office for military judges for two reasons. First, *Graf* rejected the balancing test set forth in *Matthews v. Eldridge,* 424 U.S. 319 (1976), which had long been used to resolve Fifth Amendment due process claims. Instead, the court used the less exacting Fourteenth Amendment due process standard enunciated in *Medina v. California,* 112 S. Ct. 2572 (1992), which involved review of a state criminal conviction. Second, *Graf* treated dicta from *United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles,* 350 U.S. 11 (1955), and *Palmore v. United States,* 411 U.S. 389 (1973), as approving the lack of fixed terms of office, and announced a new rule that military judges could not be removed in retaliation for their judicial decisions. Nowhere did the Court of Military Appeals suggest that military necessity precludes fixed terms for military judges generally, let alone for those who sit on the Courts of Military Review in the Washington, D.C. area or for courts-martial such as this one, which was held in peacetime.

The Court of Military Appeals' consideration of petitioner's case also produced four published opinions by the judges, though all judges voted to affirm petitioner's case. *United States v. Carpenter,* 37 M.J. 291 (C.M.A. 1993).

Judge Gierke, joined by Judge Cox, authored the opinion of the court. Relying on the decision in *Weiss,* he concluded that the military judge who tried petitioner's case and two of the three Coast Guard Court of Military Review judges (the two who were commissioned officers on active duty) who reviewed petitioner's case were appointed consistently with the Appointments Clause. App. 3a. However, with respect to the third member of the Court of Military Review panel, Chief Judge Baum, who is a civilian, the *Weiss* decision is not controlling.

The Government argued below that Chief Judge Baum's appointment to the Court of Military Review by the Judge Advocate General was a proper appointment because the Judge Advocate General was acting as delegee of the Secretary of Transportation, the head of a department. The court rejected that argument, holding that the appointment power is not delegable. App. 5a.

The Government next argued that, as a retired military officer, Chief Judge Baum was not a civilian, but remained a commissioned officer whose appointment as such made a separate appointment as a court of military review judge unnecessary in accordance with the *Weiss* decision. The court also rejected that contention. The court noted that Chief Judge Baum was employed and serving in a civilian, not a military, billet, he had not been recalled to active duty, and that judicial duties are not germane to the duties of a retired officer, because a retired officer has no duties. App. 6a.

The court then concluded that Chief Judge Baum's appointment to the court of military review was defective. App. 7a. However, it afforded *de facto* validity to the acts of the Chief Judge, relying on *Buckley v. Valeo,* 424, U.S. 1 (1976), and a January 15, 1993, memorandum of the Secretary of Transportation purporting to appoint the judges of the Coast Guard Court of Military Review, including Chief Judge Baum. App. 8a, 5a.

With respect to the Due Process issue, Judge Gierke concluded that there were sufficient protections to ensure the independence of the military judiciary. He held that there is no requirement for appellate military judges to serve as judges full time. App. 10a.

Chief Judge Sullivan concurred based on the *de facto* appointment rationale. App. 19a. Judge Crawford concurred in the opinion of the court with respect to the Due Process issue, but concurred only in the result with respect to the Appointments Clause issue, relying on her separate opinion in *Weiss*. App. 19a. Judge Wiss also concurred in the opinion of the court with respect to the Due Process issue, though he expressed misgivings about the "appearance of lack of total objectivity when associate appellate judges' principal assignments are as division chiefs under the immediate supervision of the Chief Counsel. . . ." App. 19a. He concurred only in the result, however, with respect to the Appointments Clause issue, also relying on the *de facto* appointment rationale.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

This petition, like *Weiss,* seeks to establish minimum standards for the appointment of military judges, their retention in office for a fixed term, and service as an appellate military judge as a primary duty. It does not seek to have the Uniform Code of Military Justice or the military justice system mirror that of Article III courts. Rather, it seeks to ensure that the separation of powers requirements embodied in the Appointments Clause, and the notions of fundamental fairness embodied in the Due Process Clause, are available to those tried by courts-martial. Taken alone, either the Appointments Clause or the Due Process violations would seriously undermine the fairness of the military justice system; occurring together they call

into question whether anyone in the armed forces can receive the minimal level of judicial independence that every justice system requires.

1. The Appointments Clause Violation

> Not since *Solorio v. United States,* 483 U.S. 435, 107 S.Ct. 2924 (1987), has an appeal presented questions of such fundamental importance to the institutional integrity and viability of the military justice system as does this one. App. 110a (Wiss, J., dissenting).

The Appointments Clause precludes Congress from placing the power to appoint inferior officers in anyone other than the President alone, the Courts of Law, or the Heads of Departments. U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2, Cl. 2; *Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,* 111 S. Ct. 2631, 2642 (1991). There can be little doubt that military judges, who exercise extraordinary authority and discretion, are Officers of the United States and are subject to the Appointments Clause. *See Buckley v. Valeo,* 424, U.S. 1, 126 (1976). No judge of the Court of Military Appeals disagreed with that proposition except Judge Crawford, and her position was specifically disavowed by the Department of Justice.

There is considerable force to the argument that military appellate judges are "superior" or "principal" officers, in which case the President must appoint them with the advice and consent of the Senate. But in any event, both military trial and appellate judges are at least inferior officers, and so they must be appointed either by the President, the Head of a Department, or by a Court of Law. With the exception of the after-the-fact appointment of the judges of the Coast Guard Court of Military Review by the Secretary of Transportation, no court has held that military judges are appointed to their judicial offices by any of the authorities listed in the Appointments Clause.

The only question with respect to judges who are commissioned officers, is whether their appointment as military judges, after they have been duly appointed as military officers, must be made by one of the authorities set forth in the Appointments Clause. With respect to appellate military judges who are civilians, the question is whether an after-the-fact appointment by the service Secretary provides *de facto* validity to the prior judicial acts of the judge.

The Appointments Clause preserves "the Constitution's structural integrity by preventing the diffusion of the appointment power." *Freytag,* 111 S. Ct. at 2638. As this Court reasoned in *Freytag*:

> The Appointments Clause prevents Congress from dispensing power too freely; it limits the universe of eligible recipients of the power to appoint. Because it articulates a limiting principle, the Appointments Clause does not always serve the Executive's interests. For example, *the Clause forbids Congress from granting the appointment power to inappropriate members of the Executive Branch.* Neither Congress nor the Executive can agree to waive this structural protection . . .. The structural interests protected by the appointments Clause are not those of any one Branch of government but of the entire Republic.

Freytag, 111 S. Ct. at 2639 (emphasis added).

Relying on *Shoemaker,* two Court of Military Appeals judges found that the Appointments Clause had been satisfied for all military judges who are commissioned officers of the Armed Forces, because they have already been nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, although they have not been appointed to their judicial positions in that manner. Apparently recognizing that a presidential appointment had *some* limits—for example, a Deputy Secretary of Defense could not simply

move over to become an Assistant Attorney General or a member of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission—the opinion also concluded that there was no new office created when Congress amended the Uniform Code of Military Justice in 1968 to create the positions of military trial and appellate judges because the new positions were simply continuations of the old ones, with some modest changes. Even if that assessment were correct, and petitioner agrees with the dissenters in *Weiss* that it is not, that would at most allow those who were in a judicial position in 1968—the "incumbent[s]" in *Shoemaker's* words (147 U.S. at 301)—to continue in office without a new appointment. Stated another way, *Shoemaker* can at most solve the problem for those who were already serving in judicial positions in 1968, not for those who were yet to be appointed as judges, let alone those who were not yet military lawyers.

As a fall-back Judges Gierke and Cox argued that, under *Shoemaker,* Congress can add duties to an *existing* office without requiring that the person then in office be reappointed, so long as the "new" duties are "germane" to the "old" ones of that office. What they overlook is that *Shoemaker* arose in a one-time situation where Congress had added duties to persons who were already in offices to which they had been properly appointed. But there would never be a problem for future occupants of those offices since they would be appointed to positions encompassing both the "new" and "old" duties. However, for military judgeships, the problem is repeated whenever a non-judge military lawyer replaces a military judge who retires or is transferred to a new assignment.

Even if *Shoemaker* allowed those who were serving as "law officers" in 1968 to continue in the new office of military judge, those who became military judges there-

after would fail to meet *Shoemaker's* "germaneness" test. The duties and powers of military judges, including all of those involved in petitioner's case, are so different from those of prosecutor, defense counsel, legal advisor to a command—which is what most military lawyers do before they become military judges—that there is not simply an addition of a related duty, as in *Shoemaker,* but a substitution of a new job, with entirely new functions, for an old one. Surely, no one would contend that the two civilians on the Coast Guard Court of Military Review could be plucked from civilian life, even if they were administrative law judges working for the federal government, and placed on that court without meeting the requirements of the Appointments Clause; the result should be no different for any other military judge, whether at the trial or appellate level. Similarly, no one would assume that a member of the staff of the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board could simply be "assigned" the additional duties of administrative law judge at that agency without satisfying the requirements of the Appointments Clause, yet that is the effect of the ruling below in this case and in *Weiss.* Indeed, as both *Buckley* and *Freytag* make clear, it is the function that the individual is performing that is decisive in determining whether the Appointments Clause applies at all, and under that analysis there can be no question that military judges must be separately appointed because their functions differ so markedly from those performed by other military lawyers. At the very least, these quite expansive extensions of *Shoemaker* raise serious questions that this Court should address.

The decision in *Weiss* rests on even shakier ground because the decisive vote was cast by Judge Crawford. She implicitly rejected an extension of *Shoemaker* in favor of a much more sweeping rationale—that the Appointments

Clause does not apply at all to military judges, although her rationale would lead to the conclusion that the Clause does not apply to any appointments in the Armed Forces. Her opinion conflicts with, but does not even attempt to distinguish, *Buckley,* which made clear that there are no subject-matter exemptions from the Appointments Clause based on the interest of Congress in, or plenary power over, particular subject areas. Judge Crawford's rationale also conflicts with decisions like *Rostker v. Goldberg,* 453 U.S. 57 (1981), and *Middendorf v. Henry,* 425 U.S. 25 (1976), which stand for the proposition that there are no wholesale exemptions from the Constitution simply because the case involves military affairs. Indeed, so extreme is Judge Crawford's ruling that the Department of Justice, which appeared below as an *amicus* in support of respondent, specifically rejected that position in its brief and at oral argument. It is highly unlikely that Judge Crawford would have taken the far more expansive route to affirming *Weiss's* conviction if she had been willing to accept the rationale put forward by Judge Gierke. Thus, if her "deference to Congress" analysis is in error—as it clearly seems to be—there were three votes to overturn *Weiss's* conviction.

The Court of Military Appeals upheld petitioner's conviction and sentence, despite the improper appointment of Chief Judge Baum of the Coast Guard Court of Military Review, a civilian, by relying on the *de facto* appointment rationale. App. 8a. In reaching that result, however, the court devoted only a single sentence to discussing the issue, and cited only one case, *Buckley v. Valeo,* 424 U.S 1 (1976). However, *Buckley* was an action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin the operation of the statutory provisions concerning the Federal Election Commission, not a direct appeal of a serious criminal con-

viction, and does not support the action of the lower court.

The *de facto* appointment rationale has been applied to limit the consequences of improper appointments of officeholders, particularly when the defect is of a technical nature, or when many innocent third parties would be harmed by their reliance on the acts of the improperly appointed official, as in *Buckley*. The doctrine is clearly not simple. *See Andrade v. Lauer,* 729 F.2d 1475, 1496-1501 (D.C. Cir. 1984). If it is to be extended to these circumstances, it should be by this Court, with a full discussion of the matter. It has never been applied in a case like this. The only federal criminal case in which the doctrine was relied on to sustain a conviction on a direct appeal, is *McDowell v. United States,* 159 U.S. 596 (1895). The doctrine was only an alternative basis for affirming the conviction there, and the facts of *McDowell* are substantially different from petitioner's case. In *McDowell,* a properly appointed federal district judge had been assigned to sit in a case in a different district, but the procedures followed in the assignment were challenged. This Court found the error in the assignment to be very minor and technical, if error at all, and refused to overturn the defendant's conviction. The key difference from this case, however, was that the district judge in *McDowell* had been properly appointed and commissioned by the President with the consent of the Senate as a district judge; it was only his temporary inter-district assignment that was in question.

The validity of the appointment of military judges, commissioned or civilian, under the Appointments Clause is a significant constitutional question which this Court should address. The 2-1-2 division within the Court of Military Appeals in *Weiss*, and the four-opinion decision of the court in petitioner's case reflects the serious debate

on the merits of the issue. As it did in *Weiss,* this Court should grant review to resolve this issue as promptly as possible.

2. The Due Process Violation

Most of the reasons this Court should grant review on the second question presented are set out in the previously-filed *Graf* petition and are only summarized below. But first, it is worth noting that, although the two questions presented arise under different constitutional provisions, the defects involve common concerns of accountability and fundamental fairness to an accused. Noncompliance with each of the provisions is magnified by the lack of compliance with the other, such that there is a synergistic impact on the accused's rights. To further compound the problem, the Judge Advocate General can both appoint and remove military trial and appellate judges, yet he is also responsible for supervising the efficient working of the service's military justice system, including its prosecutors.

The lower court's application of *Medina's* Fourteenth Amendment due process analysis in *Graf* to a federal Fifth Amendment due process claim is ample reason to resolve this issue. Indeed, in *Medina* this Court left open the correctness of one of its prior decisions—*United States v. Raddatz,* 447 U.S. 667, 677 (1980)—which had applied *Matthews v. Eldridge* to a due process challenge to a federal criminal conviction. Petitioner believes that respect for state legislative judgments and concerns of federalism, which loom so large in *Medina,* have no place where federal Due Process rights are at issue, but the uncertainty created by *Medina* underscores the need for this Court to settle an issue that only it can resolve. In that regard petitioner also notes that the concerns about overturning specific judgments made by state legislatures

(*Medina*), or with those made by Congress for the Armed Forces (*Middendorf v. Henry*, 425 U.S. 25, 44 (1976)), are inapplicable here because there is no evidence that in 1968, when Congress established the offices of military trial and appellate judge, it gave any thought to terms of office, let alone specifically legislated to preclude them.

The concerns raised by the lack of any fixed term of office are only exacerbated for four of the five Coast Guard Court of Military Review judges by their assignment as judges on a collateral-duty basis only. This arrangement implies that the duties of an appellate judge are simply not important enough for full-time, or even primary duty, assignment. The part-time judges are supervised and evaluated on their performance of their primary, non-judicial duties. Thus, devotion to their judicial duties could only detract from the performance of their primary duties, on which their evaluations, future promotions, and assignments depend. Furthermore, for many of the part-time judges, the Chief Counsel, the senior uniformed lawyer in the Coast Guard, is their immediate supervisor; concern about issuing judicial decisions contrary to his wishes may impinge on the independence vital to the proper performance of judicial duties.

Certainly, in time of war or other serious exigency, military necessity may require some adjustments regarding the tenure of trial judges, although not for the appellate judges who comprise the four Courts of Military Review. Moreover, neither the government nor the Court of Military Appeals has sought to justify the lack of any fixed term of office on grounds of military necessity. Instead, the Court of Military Appeals relied on other alleged protections against improper retaliation against military judges for unpopular decisions, although none of them can be invoked by an accused, even if they were actually,

as opposed to theoretically, available to the judges themselves. Even if those protections served to prevent naked retaliation, they cannot possibly guard against the more subtle and virtually undetectable problems of adverse or "faint praise" evaluations that can have significant impacts on promotions, future assignments, and susceptibility for involuntary early retirement for all military judges.

At bottom, the Court of Military Appeals fell woefully short of justifying an exception to the generally-accepted principle of American jurisprudence, as reflected in such due process cases as *Tumey v. Ohio*, 274 U.S. 510 (1927), and in the nearly universal fact that state judges have fixed terms of office, such that judicial independence for those who preside at criminal trials and hear criminal appeals is an absolute minimum protection for the accused. The due process issue alone is sufficiently important to warrant consideration by this Court, especially because the terms of office of a military judge can be cut short by a military officer who is the ultimate superior of both the judge and the prosecutor.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, petitioner prays that this Court grant review of the questions presented in order to bring the military court-martial system into line with accepted principles of American jurisprudence, and ensure that trials by court-martial are conducted and reviewed in a fair and impartial manner.

Respectfully submitted,

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APPENDIX A

U.S. COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS

No. 67,757
CMR No. 968

UNITED STATES, APPELLEE

v.

MICHAEL J. CARPENTER, SUBSISTENCE SPECIALIST SECOND CLASS, U.S. COAST GUARD, APPELLANT

Argued March 2, 1993
Decided Aug. 3, 1993
37 M.J. 291

Counsel

For Appellant: Lieutenant Commander Allen Lotz (argued); Lieutenant Commander G. Arthur Robbins.

For Appellee: Lieutenant Commander Charles J. Bennadini (argued).

Opinion of the Court

GIERKE, Judge:

A military judge sitting as a general court-martial convicted appellant, contrary to his pleas, of two specifications of assault with a dangerous weapon, one specification of impersonating an agent of superior authority, two specifications of willfully damaging military property, and

one specification of dereliction of duty, in violation of Articles 128, 134, 108, and 92, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC §§ 928, 934, 908, and 892, respectively. The approved sentence provides for a dishonorable discharge, confinement for 15 months, and reduction to the lowest enlisted grade. The Court of Military Review affirmed the findings and sentence. 34 MJ 681 (1992).

We granted review of the following issues:

I

WHETHER THE GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL MILITARY JUDGE AND THE JUDGES OF THE COURT OF MILITARY REVIEW WERE APPOINTED IN VIOLATION OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.

II

WHETHER THE ASSIGNMENT OF MILITARY APPELLATE JUDGES TO SERVE ON THE COAST GUARD COURT OF MILITARY REVIEW AS A MERE COLLATERAL DUTY COMPLIES WITH THE DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS OF ARTICLE 66, UCMJ.

III

WHETHER THE COURT OF MILITARY REVIEW ERRED WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE DELAY CAUSED BY A SECOND RCM 706 INQUIRY CONDUCTED TO REMEDY GOVERNMENT ACKNOWLEDGED FAILURE TO PERFORM AN ADEQUATE RCM 706 INQUIRY IN THE FIRST INSTANCE.

Appointment of Military Judges

Appellant elected to be tried by Captain Douglas A. Smith, United States Coast Guard, a full-time military judge designated, certified, and detailed in accordance with Article 26, UCMJ, 10 USC § 826. After appellant was convicted and sentenced, his case was reviewed by the Court of Military Review, composed of Chief Judge Baum, the full-time civilian Chief Judge of the Coast Guard Court of Military Review, and two Coast Guard captains serving as part-time appellate military judges in addition to their other legal duties. Chief Judge Baum is a retired Navy captain who served as an appellate military judge while on active duty.

We held in *United States v. Weiss*, 36 MJ 224, 226-27 (1992), *cert. granted*, __ U.S. __, 113 S.Ct. 2412, 124 L.Ed.2d 635 (1993), that judicial duties must be performed by "Officers of the United States." For the reasons set out in *Weiss,* we hold that the military judge who tried and sentenced appellant and the two Coast Guard officers who sat as members of the Court of Military Review were appointed in a manner consistent with the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Regarding the appointment of the Chief Judge, we reserved judgment in *Weiss* on the question "whether Congress inadvertently exceeded its authority by vesting the powers of an 'Officer of the United States' in civilians who had not been appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause." 36 MJ at 233.

Appellant's case presents three questions left unanswered in *Weiss*: (1) Are appellate military judges of a Court of Military Review "principal" officers, who must be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, or "inferior officers," who may be appointed by the President alone, a Department Head, or a Court of

Law? (2) Does the Appointments Clause require that a retired military officer, who has not been recalled to active duty, receive a new appointment to sit as a member of a Court of Military Review? and (3) If the Chief Judge of the Coast Guard Court of Military Review was not appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause, is the decision of that court in appellant's case valid?

The Appointments Clause distinguishes between "principal" officers, although it does not use that term, and "inferior officers," which are mentioned expressly. *See Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,* __ U.S. __, __-__, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 2641-42, 115 L.Ed.2d 764 (1991). The distinction between a "principal" and an "inferior" officer is not necessarily founded in the officer's level or scope of responsibility but, rather, in the manner of appointment. For "principal" officers, the Appointments Clause divides the power to appoint between the President and the Senate, requiring both nomination by the President and confirmation by the Senate as preconditions to appointment. *Buckley v. Valeo,* 424 U.S. 1, 132, 96 S.Ct. 612, 688, 46 L.Ed.2d. 659 (1976). The Clause expressly applies only to "Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, (and) Judges of the supreme Court." U.S. Const., art. II § 2, cl. 2. Congress has the constitutional power to decide who are otherwise "principal" officers. If Congress chooses not to allow the President, the head of a department, or a court of law to appoint an officer without Senate confirmation, then that officer remains a "principal" officer in the residual category of "all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law." If Congress allows the President, the head of a department, or a court of law to appoint certain officers without Senate confirmation, then those officers

are "inferior officers." *Buckley v. Valeo,* 424 U.S. at 132, 96 S.Ct. at 688.

Congress has authorized the Secretary of Transportation to "appoint . . . officers and employees of the Department of Transportation," of which the Coast Guard is a part (14 USC § 1), without Senate confirmation. 49 USC § 323. The Secretary of Transportation is the head of a "department" as that term is used in the Appointments Clause, since he is the head of one of the cabinet-level executive departments. *See* 5 USC § 101; *Freytag v. C.I.R.*, __ U.S. at __, 111 S.Ct. at 2643, 115 L.Ed.2d at 785. Since Congress has expressly delegated the appointment of "officers" within the Department of Transportation to the Secretary of Transportation, the Appointments Clause would be satisfied if the Secretary of Transportation appointed the judges of the Coast Guard Court of Military Review.[1]

At the time appellant's case was decided, judges of the Coast Guard Court of Military Review were appointed by the General Counsel, Department of Transportation, who is also the Judge Advocate General for the United States Coast Guard. *See United States v. Claxton,* 32 MJ 159, 160 n. * (CMA 1991). In view of 5 USC § 101, the General Counsel is not a department head, so appointment by him does not satisfy the Appointments Clause.

The Government argues that the General Counsel acted as delegee of the Secretary of Transportation in appointing the judges of the Coast Guard Court of Military Review. We reject that argument as inconsistent with the

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[1] During oral argument we were advised by counsel that the Secretary of Transportation, a department head within the meaning of the Appointments Clause, *see* 37 MJ at 293, appointed all members of the Court of Military Review on January 15, 1993, fully complying with the Appointments Clause as of that date. *See* Appendix.

intent of the framers of the Constitution to prevent "the diffusion of the appointment power." *Freytag v. C.I.R.*, __ U.S. at __, 111 S.Ct. at 2638, 115 L.Ed.2d at 779; *see United States v. Weiss,* 36 MJ at 226. Delegation of the power to appoint "inferior officers" to the General Counsel would violate the Appointments Clause, because "the Constitution limits congressional discretion to vest power to appoint 'inferior officers' to three sources: the President alone, the Heads of Departments, and 'the Court of Law,' " *Freytag v. C.I.R.*, __ U.S. at __, 111 S.Ct. at 2638, 115 L.Ed.2d at 779. Accordingly, we hold that appointment of the Chief Judge of the Coast Guard Court of Military Review by the General Counsel of the Department of Transportation does not satisfy the Appointments Clause.

The Government argues that, because the Chief Judge of the Coast Guard Court of Military Review is a retired Navy captain, he is already an Officer of the United States by virtue of his military commission, so he does not need a second judicial appointment to serve as an appellate military judge. *See United States v. Prive,* 35 MJ 569, 579 (CGCMR 1992) (Baum, C.J., concurring). There are two flaws in this argument which cause us to reject it. First, Chief Judge Baum is not acting in his capacity as a Navy captain when he sits as an appellate military judge for the Coast Guard. The Directory of Coast Guard Lawyers and Billets, submitted with appellant's pleadings, reflects that the billet for the Chief Judge is a civilian billet. Chief Judge Baum is paid as a civilian employee (GS-15), not as a Navy captain, for his service as Chief Judge. When retired officers are needed to perform military duties, they are recalled to active duty and paid at the rate provided for their military grade. *See* 10 USC § 688. Chief Judge Baum was not recalled to active duty to serve on the Court of

Military Review; he was appointed as a civilian to a civilian office. In short, he is not discharging the office of captain, United States Navy, but that of a senior civilian within the Coast Guard.

Second, Chief Judge Baum's duties as Chief Judge are not "germane" to the duties of a retired Navy officer. A retired military officer is an Officer of the United States. *See McCarty v. McCarty,* 453 U.S. 210, 221-22, 101 S.Ct. 2728, 2735-36, 69 L.Ed.2d 589 (1981); *United States v. Tyler,* 105 U.S. 244, 26 L.Ed. 985 (1882); *Flower v. United States,* 31 Ct.Cl. 35, 1800 WL 1926 (1895). Nevertheless, a retired officer has no duties; he is in the status of an officer "placed on waiting orders." *Flower v. United States,* supra at 41; *see Gibson v. United States,* 47 Ct.Cl. 554, 1911 EL 1380 (1912). Since Chief Judge Baum has no duties as a retired officer, the "germane duties" analysis of *Weiss* and *Shoemaker v. United States,* 147 U.S. 282, 301, 13 S.Ct. 361, 391, 37 L.Ed. 170 (1893), cannot apply to him.

Finally, the Government argues that Chief Judge Baum is not a "civilian" because Article 142(b), UCMJ, 10 USC § 942(b), requiring that judges of the Court of Military Appeals be appointed "from civilian life," specifically excludes certain retired military officers (including Chief Judge Baum) from the definition of "civilian life," *see* Art. 142(b)(4). While Chief Judge Baum may not be a "civilian" for purposes of appointment to the Court of Military Appeals, we regard that definition as limited to Article 142, which was intended to ensure that the Court of Military Appeals be an independent civilian court unencumbered by ties to any of the military services.

Based on the foregoing analysis, we hold that Chief Judge Baum's status as a retired military officer does not satisfy the Appointments Clause.

We next turn to the question of the effect of the Chief Judge's defective appointment. Just as the acts of the federal election commissioners were accorded *de facto* validity in *Buckley v. Valeo,* 424 U.S. at 142, 96 S.Ct. at 693, we hold that the judicial acts of the Chief Judge are entitled to *de facto* validity. Accordingly, we hold that the decision of the Court of Military Review in this case is valid, notwithstanding the defective appointment of the Chief Judge.

Part-Time Judges

Appellant contends that he was denied due process of law because two appellate military judges of the panel which decided his case were not assigned to the Court of Military Review as a primary duty. The Coast Guard Organization Manual, COMDTINST M5400.7C (7 Dec.1990), provides:

> The Court of Military Review, established under Article 66, UCMJ, by the Judge Advocate General (General Counsel DOT) is composed of the Chief Judge and not less than two additional appellate military judges. The judges may be commissioned officers or civilians. The Coast Guard Court of Military Review is normally composed of one panel of five appellate judges. All but the Chief Judge are normally Division Chiefs who serve on the court as a collateral duty.

COMDTINST M5400.7C, *supra* at 2.7.8.

Appellant bases his argument on two decisions from our Court which held that it was jurisdictional error to detail military judges to general courts-martial whose primary duty was other than judicial duties. *United States v. Beckermann,* 27 MJ 334 (CMA 1989); *United States v.*

Moorehead, 20 USCMA 574, 44 CMR 4 (1971). Those decisions are distinguishable from appellant's case because they were based on Article 26(c) of the Code which provides:

> A commissioned officer who is certified to be qualified for duty as a military judge of a general court-martial may perform such duties only when he is assigned and directly responsible to the Judge Advocate General, or his designee, of the armed force of which the military judge is a member and may perform duties of a judicial or nonjudicial nature other than those relating to his primary duty as a military judge of a general court-martial when such duties are assigned to him by or with the approval of that Judge Advocate General or his designee.

No such or similar provision is found in Article 66, UCMJ, 10 USC § 866, pertaining to appellate military judges assigned to a Court of Military Review. We have found nothing in the legislative history of Article 66 indicating that Congress intended that the duty restrictions of Article 26(c) be incorporated in Article 66. We decided *Moorehead* on the basis of a statutory requirement, not constitutional due process. The purpose of the statutory requirement was explained in *Beckermann*: "to assure the independence and the professionalism of the judges who presided over general court-martial." 27 MJ at 338. The concern of Congress in enacting Article 26(c) was to remove trial judges from the command of convening authorities and commanders in the field and place them under the direct supervision and control of the Judge Advocate General or his designee. *Id.* In *United States v. Graf,* 35 MJ 450 (CMA 1992), *cert. granted sub nom. Weiss v. United States, supra* (*see* 37 MJ at 293), we grappled with the requirement for judicial independence at

both the trial and appellate levels, and we concluded that, even without a fixed term of office, both trial and appellate military judges enjoy institutional protections sufficient to guarantee their judicial independence and thereby satisfy constitutional due process. The Coast Guard Organization Manual provides institutional independence by requiring that only division chiefs in the office of the Chief Counsel, not subject to the control of convening authorities in the field, be assigned collateral duty as appellate military judges. 37 MJ at 295. Accordingly, we are satisfied that the appellate military judges who decided appellant's case were sufficiently independent to satisfy the requirements of constitutional due process.

We hold that, absent a statutory provision such as that in Article 26(c), there is no constitutional or statutory requirement that appellate military judges perform only judicial duties or that they serve as full-time judges. Whether such a requirement would be desirable is a question for Congress, not this Court. *See United States v. Weiss,* 36 MJ at 234.

Speedy Trial

At trial, appellant moved to dismiss the charges for lack of speedy trial. At issue is the period from May 7 to June 4, 1990, during which a second inquiry into appellant's mental capacity to stand trial was conducted, pursuant to the order of the military judge. If that period is charged to the Government, appellant is entitled to dismissal of the charges in accordance with RCM 707(d), Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1984.

Appellant was placed in pretrial confinement on February 3, 1990. His commander ordered a one-member sanity board on the following grounds:

> SS2 Carpenter is charged with serious UCMJ offenses alleging willful discharge of a firearm on two separate

> occasions into living spaces, which placed the inhabitants in serious physical danger. On one occasion, the accused discharged a .22 caliber rife (sic) into the communications spaces inhabited by the Coast Guard Station Brant Point watchstanders. In the other instance, SS2 Carpenter allegedly fired the same .22 caliber rifle with a scope through the bathroom window of a government owned housing unit, which was then occupied by a Coast Guard dependent wife. In the course of the investigation of these instances, SS2 Carpenter supposedly falsely portrayed himself as a Coast Guard Intelligence Agent to the local police so that he could examine any evidence that had been collected. Additionally, there is information which indicates that SS2 Carpenter had received psychological testing and evaluation as a result of his response to stressful situations in the past. Due to the seriousness of the charges and the apparent lack of a discernible motive on the part of the accused, an examination into the accused's mental condition is deemed warranted.

Appellant was examined by the one-member sanity board on March 5, 1990. On March 12 the sanity board issued its report finding appellant competent to stand trial. The charges were referred to a general court-martial on April 24.

On May 3, 1990, trial counsel informed defense counsel that he belived that appellant was not competent to stand trial. Trial counsel based his belief on information that appellant was continuing to claim that he was a United States Treasury Agent and that appellant claimed to have been associated with the "CIA," so he might be suffering from a "grandiose delusional disorder." *See* 34 MJ at 682.

Both trial counsel and defense counsel visited the convening authority to discuss the possibility of alternate disposition of the case if appellant was not competent. The convening authority suggested raising the issue with the military judge.

At a conference under RCM 802 on the same day, trial counsel requested the military judge to order a new sanity board. Defense counsel indicated that the original sanity board had been "cursory and inadequate," that he did not oppose the motion for a new sanity board, but that he could not request it because "it would strain his relationship with his client." On May 4 the military judge ordered a second sanity board. At a later RCM 802 conference, appellant objected to any further delays of his case and informed the military judge that he disagreed with his counsel's decision not to oppose the request for a new sanity board.

On May 11, 1990, defense counsel learned that appellant's references to "CIA" were to the Culinary Institute of America, not the Central Intelligence Agency. Counsel requested another RCM 802 conference to inform the military judge that he no longer considered a second sanity board necessary and to request that the charges be dismissed for a violation of RCM 707 or that "trial proceed immediately." Trial counsel argued that a second sanity board was still necessary because appellant "had been misrepresenting himself as a treasury agent for the past 8 years" and had engaged in "other bizarre behavior," including drawing a weapon on a fellow crew member and threatening a local civilian police officer. The military judge informed both counsel that he "would NOT entertain" a motion to dismiss in an RCM 802 conference but that he "remained convinced" of the need for a new sanity board.

Arrangements were made to have appellant evaluated by a three-member sanity board at Lackland Air Force Base, located in San Antonio, Texas. On May 14 appellant arrived at Lackland for an estimated 2-week period of in-patient evaluation. After "extensive observation, psychological testing, an electroencephalogram, and a computed tomogram (CT scan) of his head" as well as a personal interview, the sanity board determined that appellant had "sufficient mental capacity" to stand trial. On May 25 he was returned to his home duty station in Nantucket, Massachusetts.

When the court-martial convened on June 4, 1990, defense counsel moved to dismiss the charges for violation of RCM 707. As the basis for his argument that the time required for the second sanity board should be charged to the Government, defense counsel argued that the Government had negligently misinterpreted appellant's reference to the "CIA" and that the two instances of bizarre behavior used to justify the second sanity board were known to the Government in February, well before the first sanity board, but were not made known to that sanity board. Defense counsel did not assert "bad faith" on the part of the Government.

The military judge denied the motion to dismiss. In his written findings of fact and ruling on the motion, the military judge stated that his bases for ordering a second sanity board were:

> (1) the trial counsel's representations that the information concerning the accused's claims to be an agent of various other government agencies had not been brought to the attention of the initial RCM 706 Board and (2) *both* counsel's representations that the *actual* examination which formed the basis for the first RCM 706 report (Def.Ex.B) had only lasted 2-3 hours.

Regarding the mistaken references to the "CIA," the military judge stated:

> [T]he defense counsel's representation on 11 May 1990 that the Government's mistaken belief that the accused had represented himself to be a CIA agent eight years ago was not enough to convince me that a further examination was no longer necessary. I reached this conclusion because I never specifically relied on that piece of information in making my original decision to order the new evaluation. The basis for continuing my order was that the prior evaluation was not trustworthy and that a more thorough evaluation would serve the ends of justice.

The military judge ruled that the "entire period" required for the second sanity board, from May 7 until June 4, 1990, was excludable from the time chargeable to the Government. By excluding that period from the time chargeable to the Government along with a total of 19 days which are not challenged, the military judge charged the Government with responsibility for only 74 of the 122 days of delay.

Two issues are involved: (1) Did the military judge abuse his discretion by ordering a second sanity board? and (2) was the time required to conduct the second sanity board properly excluded from the time chargeable to the Government?

The question whether additional psychiatric examination is necessary rests within the discretion of the military judge and is reviewable only for abuse of discretion. *United States v. Frederick*, 3 MJ 230, 232-33 (CMA 1977). We hold that the military judge did not abuse his discretion by ordering a second sanity board in this case. Both counsel regarded the first sanity board as cursory and inadequate. Both counsel informed the military judge that

the first sanity board had not considered significant relevant information. Under the circumstances, it was well within the limits of the military judge's discretion to order a second sanity board.

Turning to the second issue, we note that RCM 707(d) and (e), prior to that Rule's amendment on July 6, 1991, provided that failure to bring an accused held in pretrial confinement to trial within 90 days "shall result in dismissal of the affected charges upon timely motion by the accused." RCM 707(c)(1)(A) specifically excluded from the 90-day period any delays resulting from an "examination into the mental capacity or responsibility of the accused." Nevertheless, as we stated in *United States v. Longhofer*, 29 MJ 22, 27 (CMA 1989), "[I]t cannot be said that the mere happening of any of the events listed in RCM 707(c)(1)-(8) results in an *automatic* exclusion, because all of them contemplate that the length of time excluded will be *reasonable*."

Appellant argues that the delay attributable to the second sanity board is not reasonable because the Government was negligent. *See United States v. Longhofer*, 29 MJ at 29 (exclusion is inapplicable when the Government has not been "reasonably diligent" in pursuing pretrial matters). He argues that a second sanity board would not have been necessary if the Government had provided all relevant information to the first sanity board. The Court of Military Review rejected the "negligence" standard and decided the speedy-trial issue on a "bad-faith" standard. 34 MJ at 685. We hold that the correct standard is neither negligence nor bad faith; the correct standard under *Longhofer* is reasonableness.

The *Longhofer* requirement that excludable periods of time be "reasonable" does not necessarily require mistake-free processing. Nevertheless, evidence of either

negligence or bad faith is relevant to the extent that it proves whether the event in question was accomplished in a reasonable period of time. The parties do not dispute that the second sanity board in this case was conducted in a reasonable period of time. Having reviewed the record, we hold that the period from May 7 to June 4 was a reasonable time to arrange for an extensive evaluation in a facility operated by a sister service in a distant place. Accordingly, we hold that the Court of Military Review did not err in holding that the Government should not be held accountable for the delay caused by the second sanity board.

Assuming *arguendo* that the time consumed by the first sanity board was "unreasonable" because the board was not conducted properly, adding the period from March 5 to 12 to the time chargeable to the Government still leaves the total chargeable time well below 90 days. Accordingly, we hold that appellant was not entitled to dismissal of the charges for a violation of RCM 707(d).

We have also considered whether appellant is entitled to dismissal of the charges under the more stringent requirements of *United States v. Burton,* 21 USCMA 112, 44 CMR 166 (1971), as modified by *United States v. Driver,* 23 USCMA 243, 49 CMR 376 (1974). The record does not reflect whether the first psychiatric examination was requested by the defense or was simply ordered by the command. In either event, the delay associated with that examination is not chargeable to the Government. *See United States v. McClain,* 1 MJ 60, 63 (CMA 1975) (psychiatric examination requested by pretrial investigating officer not chargeable to Government). The second psychiatric examination was ordered by the military judge, not because of the mistaken references to the "CIA" but because he was convinced that appellant's behavior

warranted a more extensive evaluation. This delay likewise is not chargeable to the Government. *Id.* The delay associated with the two psychiatric examinations, when added to earlier delays requested by the defense, brings the time chargeable to the Government below 90 days. Therefore, the *Burton* presumption of a violation of Article 10, UCMJ, 10 USC § 810, was not triggered in this case.[2]

Decision

The decision of the United States Coast Guard Court of Military Review is affirmed.

Judge Cox concurs.

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[2] Having found no *Burton* violation, we need not decide whether RCM 707, Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1984, superseded *Burton*. See United States v. Kossman, 37 MJ 232 (CMA 1993) (raising issue whether RCM 707 overruled *Burton*).

APPENDIX

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Office of the Secretary of Transportation

MEMORANDUM

Subject: APPOINTMENT OF APPELLATE MILITARY JUDGES TO THE COAST GUARD COURT OF MILITARY REVIEW

Date: January 15, 1993

From: The Secretary

To: Chief Judge, U.S. Coast Guard Court of Military Review

1. The assignment of appellate military judges to the Coast Guard Court of Military Review, as reflected in the General Counsel's memo of April 20, 1992, is adopted this date as judicial appointments of my own. Those judges presently assigned and appointed by me are:

Chief Judge
Joseph H. Baum

Judges
Alfred F. Bridgman, Jr.
Michael C. Grace
John A. Bastek
Terrance M. Edwards

The judicial duties and powers of these judges will be as prescribed under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

SULLIVAN, Chief Judge (concurring):

I agree with the principal opinion in this case, although I dissented in *United States v. Weiss*, 36 MJ 224, 240 (CMA 1992), *cert. granted*, __ U.S. __, 113 S.Ct. 2412, 124 L.Ed.2d 635 (1993). I perceive no inconsistency in this regard because of the manner in which the particular Appointments Clause, *see* 37 MJ at 293, question is resolved in this case.

CRAWFORD, Judge (concurring in part and in the result):

I wholeheartedly concur with the principal opinion concerning the discussion of part-time judges and the speedy trial issue. However, I only concur in the result as to application of the Appointments Clause, *see* 37 MJ at 293, to appellate judges. *United States v. Weiss*, 36 MJ 224, 234 (CMA 1992) (Crawford, J., concurring in the result), *cert. granted*, __ U.S. __, 113 S.Ct. 2412, 124 L.Ed.2d 635 (1993).

WISS, Judge (concurring in part and in the result):

As to Issue I, I concur in the result. For the reasons that I set out in my dissenting opinion in *United States v. Weiss*, 36 MJ 224, 256 (CMA 1992), *cert. granted*, __ U.S. __, 113 S.Ct. 2412, 124 L.Ed.2d 635 (1993), I believe that neither the military judge nor any of the appellate judges were properly appointed. However, I am willing to apply the *de facto*-appointee rationale of *Buckley v. Valeo*, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976), to this case: Concerning the military judge and the associate judges of the Court of Military Review, the majority in *Weiss* approved their appointment, so I will consider them *de facto* appointees; as to the Chief Judge of the Court of Military Review, since he acted on this case before this Court held his appointment improper, I join in extending his appointment *de facto* validity.

Regarding Issue II, I must confess some misgivings about at least the appearance of lack of total objectivity when associate appellate judges' principal assignments are as division chiefs under the immediate supervision of the Chief Counsel, the Coast Guard's top-ranking uniformed lawyer. The unanimous opinion of this Court in *United States v. Graf,* 35 MJ 450 (CMA 1992), *cert. granted sub nom. Weiss v. United States, supra,* however, ultimately persuades me to concur in the principal opinion that due-process notions are not offended by the Coast Guard's structure of its Court of Military Review.

As to Issue III, I concur in the principal opinion's discussion and disposition of the claimed denial of speedy trial under RCM 707, Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1984. I concur only in the result, however, with the disposition of the speedy-trial claim under *United States v. Burton,* 21 USCMA 112, 44 CMR 166 (1971). I do not read the Court's opinion in *United States v. McClain,* 1 MJ 60 (CMA 1975), to support a black-letter rule that a pretrial psychiatric examination is never chargeable to the Government for *Burton* purposes. The Court there took pains to make clear to the contrary:

> For the purposes of this case, and without definitively assigning to which party the period involved in a sanity inquiry is chargeable, the 18-day delay in the Article 32 investigation for the examination of this accused will not be considered against the Government.

Id. at 63. In any event, assuming that this case does give rise to the *Burton* presumption of a violation of Article 10, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC § 810, the factual circumstances fully set out in the principal opinion lead me to conclude that extraordinary circumstances accounted for not trying appellant within 90 days of his pretrial confinement so that the presumption is rebutted.

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD
COURT OF MILITARY REVIEW

CGCM No. 0042
Docket No. 968

UNITED STATES

v.

MICHAEL J. CARPENTER, SUBSISTENCE SPECIALIST
SECOND CLASS, U.S. COAST GUARD

January 27, 1992
34 M.J. 681

General Court-Martial convened by Commander, First Coast Guard District, Boston, Massachusetts. Tried at the Office of the Commander, First Coast Guard District, Boston, Massachusetts on 11-14 June 1990.

Military Judge: CAPT Douglas A. Smith, USCG.

Trial Counsel: LT John B. Gately, USCG

Defense Counsel: LT Jeffrey D. Stieb, USCG

Appellate Defense Counsel: LCDR G. Arthur Robbins, USCG

Appellate Government Counsel: LCDR Charles J. Bennardini, USCG

BEFORE
PANEL TWO
BAUM, GRACE, AND BASTEK
Appellate Military Judges

GRACE, Judge:

The Appellant was tried by a general court-martial consisting of a military judge alone. Contrary to his pleas, he was found guilty of two specifications of assault with a dangerous weapon under Article 128 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), one specification of impersonating an agent of superior authority under Article 134, UCMJ, two specifications of willfully damaging military property under Article 108, UCMJ, and one specification of dereliction of duty under Article 92, UCMJ. He was sentenced to confinement at hard labor for fifteen months, reduction to the lowest enlisted pay grade (E-1), and to be discharged from the service with a Dishonorable Discharge. The convening authority approved the sentence as adjudged.

On the evening of 31 January 1990, the Communications Watch at the Brant Point Coast Guard Station on Nantucket Island was disrupted when four .22 caliber bullets smashed through the watchroom's double-plated glass window where a Coast Guard watchstander was on duty. Two nights later, at a Coast Guard government housing unit, three more shots were fired through a bathroom window just as the occupant left the bathroom and turned out the light. No one was injured in either incident.

Petty Officer Second Class Michael Carpenter was accused of firing the shots and was arrested and placed in pretrial confinement.

The Appellant has raised four errors before this court. Oral argument was heard on October 17, 1991, and the case is ready for decision.

Petty Officer Carpenter was arrested and placed in pretrial confinement on 3 February 1990. On March 5, the Convening Authority ordered a sanity board under Rule for Courts-Martial 706. "If it appears to any commander

who considers the disposition of charges . . . that there is reason to believe that the accused lacked mental responsibility for any offense charged or lacks capacity to stand trial, that fact and the basis of the belief or observation shall be transmitted . . . to the officer authorized to order an inquiry into the mental condition of the accused." R.C.M. 706(a). The Convening Authority is authorized to order such an inquiry before referral of charges. R.C.M. 706(b). The basis for ordering the evaluation was "the seriousness of the charges and apparent lack of discernible motive on the part of the accused. . . ." Commander, U.S. Coast Guard Group Woods Hole letter dated 5 March 1990. After an examination by a one-person board, the Appellant was declared mentally competent to participate in his own defense and was found not to be suffering from a mental disease or defect at the time of the commission of the offenses.

On 3 May 1990, the Trial Counsel informed the Defense Counsel that he believed that the Appellant was not competent to stand trial. The Trial Counsel had recently learned that the Appellant continued to claim that he was a United States Treasury Agent. The Trial Counsel had also received information that the Appellant had claimed to have been with the C.I.A. This information led the Trial Counsel to believe that the Appellant might be suffering from a grandiose delusional disorder. Additional information had also come to the Trial Counsel's attention that Appellant had made threats against a local police officer and had "drawn down" on a fellow crewmember on 31 January 1990. ("Drawing down" apparently involved pointing a pistol at the crewmember and continuing to point it at him for an extended period of time.)

On May 5, 1990, the Trial Counsel requested another sanity evaluation under R.C.M. 706. An R.C.M. 802 Con-

ference was held,[1] in which the Defense Counsel concurred in Trial Counsel's request.

Based on the representations by the Trial Counsel, the military judge ordered the second R.C.M. 706 evaluation.[2] In his "Essential Findings and Ruling on Speedy Trial Motion" he stated that the deciding factors in ordering a second R.C.M. 706 evaluation were: "(1) the trial counsel's representations that the information concerning the accused's claims to be an agent of various other government agencies had not been brought to the attention of the initial R.C.M. 706 Board and (2) both counsel's representations that the actual examination which formed the basis for the first R.C.M. 706 report (Def. Ex. B) had only lasted 2-3 hours." Appellate Exhibit XL at page 2. [Emphasis appears in the original.] He went on to say "[t]he basis for continuing my order was that the prior evaluation was not trustworthy and that a more thorough evaluation would serve the ends of justice." Appellate Exhibit XL at page 2.

The first evidence was presented on the merits 123 days after the Appellant was ordered into pretrial confinement on 6 June 1990. The Appellant moved for dismissal of all charges based upon a denial of his right to a speedy trial. R.C.M. 707[3] requires that an accused be brought to trial

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[1] R.C.M. 802. Conferences.

(a) In general. After referral, the military judge may, upon request of any party or sua sponte, order one or more conferences with the parties to consider such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial.

[2] ". . . The military judge may order a mental examination of the accused regardless of any earlier determination by the convening authority." R.C.M. 706(b)(2).

[3] R.C.M. 707 was changed by Change No. 5 to the M.C.M. on 27 June 1991. However, since this case was tried before that change was in affect, all references to R.C.M.s are to the R.C.M. in effect on the date of trial.

within 120 days after the imposition of restriction in lieu of arrest, or pretrial confinement pursuant to R.C.M. 304(a). In addition, R.C.M. 707(d) requires that immediate steps shall be taken to bring to trial an accused in pretrial arrest or confinement under R.C.M. 304 or 305. It also provides that no accused shall be held in pretrial arrest or confinement in excess of 90 days. If an accused is held in pretrial confinement beyond 90 days (not counting certain deductible periods), a presumption arises that the accused's right to a speedy trial has been violated. *U.S. v. Burton,* 21 U.S.C.M.A. 112, 44 C.M.R. 166 (1971). Certain periods are excluded from the Government's accountability when calculating the 90 days under R.C.M. 707(d). The military judge took evidence on the motion and made essential findings. The military judge denied the Appellant's motion for dismissal after concluding that four periods of delay, including a 29-day delay associated with a second R.C.M. 706 evaluation, were excluded from the Government's accountability.[4]

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[4] The military judge ruled that the following were excluded from Government accountability: 1. The first R.C.M. 706 examination 5-12 March 1990, 8 days; 2. A defense requested delay in the Article 32 Investigation 17-26 March 1990, 8 days; 3. A defense requested delay 4-7 May 1990, 3 days; and 4. The second R.C.M. 706 examination 7 May-4 June 1990, 29 days. "Essential Findings and Ruling on Speedy Trial Motion," Appellate Exhibit XL.

Assignment of Error 1

THE MILITARY JUDGE ERRED TO THE SUBSTANTIAL PREJUDICE OF THE ACCUSED, BY EXCLUDING FROM GOVERNMENT SPEEDY TRIAL ACCOUNTABILITY THE UNREASONABLE DELAY CREATED BY A SECOND R.C.M. 706 EVALUATION THAT WAS A RESULT OF THE GOVERNMENT'S FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY CONDUCT THE INITIAL R.C.M. 706 EVALUATION.

There are two aspects to the ordering of the second R.C.M. 706 examination. The first is whether the military judge acted properly in ordering the second examination. The second is whether the Government should be held accountable for the 29-day delay that occurred while the examination was conducted and the board's report was filed.

The Appellant focused this appeal on the latter aspect and argues that the military judge committed prejudicial error by failing to hold the Government accountable for its negligence in conducting the first R.C.M. 706 examination without providing the medical board all relevant information in the possession of the Government. Before discussing that issue, we will dispose of any doubt concerning the first aspect of this issue.

"[T]he question of whether another examination was necessary was a matter within the discretion of the military judge." *U.S. v. Frederick*, 3 M.J. 230, 232-233 (CMA 1977). This Court is satisfied that the military judge did not abuse his discretion by ordering a second R.C.M. 706 examination. The judge conducted a full inquiry into the necessity for a second sanity board. His ruling is supported by the evidence on the record. His ruling was well within his discretion, and we find he did not abuse that discretion.

The issue raised by the Appellant is not one concerning the appropriateness of the judge's ruling, but rather whether the Government should be charged for the 29-day delay resulting from the second R.C.M. 706 examination. The military judge ruled that the 29-day delay should be excluded from the Government's accountability. The Appellant is asking us to overrule the military judge and charge the delay to the Government due to its negligence by failing to make certain information available to the first R.C.M. 706 board.

The military judge held the Government accountable for 74 days of delay under the Speedy Trial Rule (R.C.M. 707(d)). If the Appellant's argument prevails, 29 additional days would be added to the Government's accountability bringing the total to 103 days thereby violating the R.C.M. 707 (d) 90-day rule.

At trial it became clear that, although the Trial Counsel believed the information provided to the military judge at the R.C.M. 802 Conference to be new, a Government investigator had learned of these incidents as early as 13 or 14 February 1990. Also the reference to the C.I.A. was found to be a reference to the Culinary Institute of America, not the Central Intelligence Agency.

Despite the fact that agents of the Government knew of these incidents and they were not reported to the first R.C.M. 706 board, the military judge found "that the government did not act in bad faith in failing to inform the initial R.C.M. 706 Board about the accused's claimed involvement with other government agencies or about the two incidents described (Threats and 'drawing down') in Para. 2 of App. Exh. VII." Appellate Exhibit XL at page 3. He went on to say "I also find that the government did not act in bad faith in misinterpreting the information it received about the 'CIA' from then SSC Bernard." Appellate Exhibit XL at page 3.

As far as this Court can determine, there are no established standards for what must be presented to a board conducting an R.C.M. 706 evaluation. Moreoever, we have found no cases on the precise issue before this Court: whether there are exceptions to the R.C.M. 707 (c)(1)(A) mandate requiring exclusion from speedy trial computation of delay resulting from examination into the mental capacity or responsibility of an accused and, if there are such exceptions, under what circumstances should they apply. In other words, when, if ever, should the Government be held accountable for the delay resulting from an R.C.M. 706 mental evaluation of the accused?

While no cases have been found directly on point, there is language in *U.S. v. Tebsherany*, 32 M.J. 351 (CMA 1991) which offers guidance. That case dealt with a speedy trial issue and the accountability for delay requested by the defense. When determining whether the requirement for trial within 120 days has been met, R.C.M. 707 (c)(3) calls for exclusion of defense requested delay in the same manner as delay from mental examination under R.C.M. 707 (c)(1)(A).

Despite that provision, Judge Cox, in *U.S. v. Tebsherany supra*, points to at least one instance when defense requested delay may be included in the 120 days for which the Government is accountable:

> If the Government interferes with discovery or *acts in bad faith* to preclude defense counsel's preparation for...[an Article 32 investigation] proceeding, an accused would be deprived of his right to effective representation. From this, it would follow that time requested by counsel to examine material not disclosed until the pretrial investigation might, *under facts showing bad faith*, be charged to the United States in accounting for pretrial delay. (Emphasis added)

Here, the Appellant has asked this Court to take a giant leap beyond that contemplated in *U.S. v. Tebsherany, supra,* citing as authority language in *U.S. v. Longhofer*, 29 M.J. 22, 27 (CMA 1989), *U.S. v. Carlisle*, 25 M.J. 426, 428 (CMA 1988) and *U.S. v. Cherok*, 22 M.J. 438, 440 (CMA 1986). Appellant argues that negligence rather than bad faith on the part of the Government should require charging the Government with the delay from the second mental examination board. Appellant asserts that information used as a basis for requesting the second R.C.M. 706 board was known by Government agents at the time of the first examination and should have been transmitted to that first board. Negligence is not providing that known information to the first board and the negligent manner in which the first examination was conducted should shift accountablity for delay to the Government, according to Appellant.

We need not reach the question whether there was, in fact, negligence on the part of the Government because we do not believe that negligence is the proper standard for assessing whether delay normally excluded from speedy trial computation should be charged to the Government. *U.S. v. Tebsherany, supra*, suggests a "bad faith" standard for such matters, and we agree with that approach. That, in fact, was the standard the trial judge applied when he made his findings.

Accordingly, we reject the argument that this Court should establish a "negligence" standard for the information that must be provided to a R.C.M. 706 Board. We find that the military judge's use of "bad faith," as the standard to be applied to the Government in this case, appropriate for measuring the Government's actions when providing information to a board convened under R.C.M. 706.

As a separate matter, the Discussion section, following the R.C.M. 707(d) 90-day confinement provision, refers to judicial decisions holding that a presumption of speedy trial violation arises when an accused has been in pretrial confinement for more than 90 days. This is based on the language found in *U.S. v. Burton, supra*. Our reading of R.C.M. 707(d) in conjunction with *U.S. v. Burton, supra*, leads us to conclude that a two-part analysis must be done when analyzing delays in bringing an accused to trial who was in pretrial confinement for longer than 90 days. We must be satisfied that the delays excluded from the Government's accountability were properly excluded under R.C.M. 707(d) and that the Government has overcome its heavy burden under *U.S. v. Burton, supra*, to show that the accused's right to a speedy trial under Article 10, UCMJ was not violated. The discussion of that rule indicates that reasonable delays for examinations into mental capacity or mental responsibility ordinarily are not included in the 90-day presumption. No elaboration of the term reasonable is provided—whether it relates only to length of delay or is broad enough to encompass reasonableness in ordering the examination. Under either interpretation, we find the delay for the second examination was reasonable. It was not unduly long, and the judge had a reasonable basis for ordering it.

We find that the military judge did not abuse his discretion when he did not charge the 29-day delay for the second R.C.M. 706 Board to the Government. We are satisfied by that ruling that the Government's burden under *U.S. v. Burton, supra*, was also met. His ruling on the Speedy Trial Motion was proper and will not be reversed. Based on that ruling, the Appellant was brought to trial within the time limits prescribed by law.

This Court commends the participants in this court-martial for the manner in which they fulfilled the obligation to ensure that an accused who may not be competent to stand trial or may not be mentally responsible for the offenses for which charged does not stand trial. The record shows that the trial counsel, defense counsel and military judge all had doubts about the Appellant's mental condition and took the appropriate steps required by the UCMJ to ensure that he was fully evaluated prior to trial.

Assignment of Error III

CHARGE II AND THE SPECIFICATIONS THEREUNDER ARE MULTIPLICIOUS FOR FINDINGS WITH SPECIFICATIONS 1 AND 2 OF CHARGE 1

Although this Court, in an earlier decision (*U.S. v. Howard,* 24 M.J. 897 (CGCMR 1987)), exhaustively examined multiplicity, this case does not require that kind of exhaustive analysis. The basic rule for multiplicity laid out in *U.S. v. Baker*, 14 M.J. 361 (CMA 1983) will suffice. The U.S. Court of Military Appeals has held that "in cases in which application of the Baker standard has compelled a conclusion that findings were multiplicious, we have viewed as plain error the failure of the trial or intermediate appellate courts to dismiss the included offenses. In such instances, we have not hesitated to grant relief, even though the defense had not complained of multiplicousness at trial or on appeal." *U.S. v. Holt*, 16 M.J. 393, 394 (CMA 1983). In *Holt* the Court went on to say "however, we do not believe that, in testing for multiplicousness, we need go beyond the language of the specifications on which the case is tried." *Id.* at 394.

The Appellant raises for the first time on appeal the issue of multiplicity for finding of Specifications 1 and 2 of Charges I and II. We have examined the specifications to determine if, after applying the *Baker* Rule, we are compelled to make the conclusion that the findings were multiplicious. Our answer is no. The specifications under Charge I allege assaults with intent to commit murder against named individuals with a dangerous weapon by firing it through a window. The specifications were modified by the military judge during his findings to just assaults with a dangerous weapon.

The specifications under Charge II allege that on two occasions the Appellant without proper authority willfully damaged, by gunfire, military property of the United States.

The elements of proof of assault with a dangerous weapon are: (1) That the accused attempted to do bodily harm to a certain person; (2) That the accused did so with a certain weapon; (3) That the attempt was done with unlawful force or violence; (4) That the weapon was used in a manner likely to produce death or grievous bodily harm; and (5) That the weapon was a loaded firearm. Manual for Courts-Martial (M.C.M.) paragraph 54b(4)(a).

The elements of proof for destruction of military property are: (1) That the accused, without proper authority, damaged certain property; (2) That the property was military property of the United States; (3) That the damage was willfully caused by the accused; and (4) That the damage was of a certain amount. M.C.M. paragraph 32d(2).

The specifications under Charge I allege crimes against a person and those under Charge II allege crimes against

property. The elements of proof of the two offenses are different. The only commonality between them is that a firearm was used in the commission of each offense. This Court does not feel compelled by the language of the specifications to draw the conclusion that the specifications under Charges I and II are multiplicious for findings. Therefore, Assignment of Error III is rejected.

Assignments of Error II and IV[5] are without merit and are rejected for the reasons stated in *U.S. v. Smith*, 27 M.J. 242, 248 (CMA 1988) and *U.S. v. Ezell*, 6 M.J. 307, 327 (CMA 1979) (Fletcher, C.J. concurring) with respect to Assignment of Error II and *U.S. v. Stewart*, 29 M.J. 621 (CGCMR 1989) and *U.S. v. Payne*, 22 M.J. 592 (CGCMR 1986) with respect to Assignment of Error IV.

Based on the entire record, the findings and sentence are correct in law and fact and should be approved. Accordingly, the findings and sentence, as approved below, are affirmed.

Chief Judge BAUM and Judge BASTEK concur.

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[5] The Appellant's Assignments of Error II and IV were: II. THE MILITARY JUDGE DENIED APPELLANT DUE PROCESS OF LAW BY DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR TRIAL BY UNANIMOUS JURY; AND IV. THE CONVENING AUTHORITY WAS PROVIDED A DEFECTIVE 1106 RECOMMENDATION BY A LAW SPECIALIST WHO DID NOT HAVE PROPER AUTHORITY, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE UCMJ, AND WHO WAS FURTHER DISQUALIFIED BY CONFLICT.

APPENDIX C

U.S. COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS

No. 67,869
NMCM 89 4189

UNITED STATES, APPELLEE

v.

ERIC A. WEISS, PRIVATE
U.S. MARINE CORPS, APPELLANT

Argued October 6, 1992
Decided December 21, 1992
36 M.J. 224

Counsel

For appellant: Commander Philip D. Cave, JAGC, USN (argued); Captain Dwight H. Sullivan, USMC and Lieutenant Franklin J. Foil, JAGC, USNR (on brief).

For appellee: Lieutenant Commander Lawrence W. Muschamp, JAGC, USN (argued); Colonel T.G. Hess, USMC (on brief).

Military Judge: Edward F. Pesik, Jr.

Opinion

GIERKE, Judge:

A military judge sitting as a special court-martial convicted appellant, consistent with his pleas, of stealing a racquetball glove from the base exchange, in violation of Article 121, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC § 921. The approved sentence provides for a bad-conduct

discharge, confinement and partial forfeitures for 3 months. The Court of Military Review affirmed the findings and sentence in an unpublished opinion dated January 31, 1992.

This Court granted review of the following issue:[1]

> WHETHER APPELLANTS COURT-MARTIAL LACKED JURISDICTION WHERE THE MILITARY JUDGE WAS DESIGNATED IN VIOLATION OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION, AND WHETHER THE NAVY-MARINE CORPS COURT OF MILITARY REVIEW WAS WITHOUT POWER TO REVIEW THIS CASE WHERE ITS JUDGES WERE DESIGNATED IN VIOLATION OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.

Appellant argues that military judges must be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate as military judges. The Government argues that military judges already have been nominated and confirmed as military officers, that military officers traditionally have performed judicial duties, and that military officers need not receive an additional appointment to perform judicial duties. We hold that the Constitution does not require that

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[1] We also granted review of the following issue:

> WHETHER THE COURT-MARTIAL WHICH TRIED THIS CASE HAD JURISDICTION WHERE THE MILITARY JUDGE WAS NOT APPOINTED TO A FIXED TERM OF OFFICE, AND DID THE NAVY-MARINE-CORPS COURT OF MILITARY REVIEW HAVE POWER TO REVIEW AND AFFIRM THIS CASE WHERE ITS JUDGES WERE NOT APPOINTED TO A FIXED TERM OF OFFICE.

This issue was resolved in *United States v. Graf*, 35 MJ 450 (CMA 1992).

a military officer who meets the qualifications of Article 26, UCMJ, 10 USC § 826, receive a second appointment to perform the duties of a military judge. Likewise, we hold that a military officer meeting the qualifications of Article 66, UCMJ, 10 USC § 866, need not receive a second appointment to perform the duties of an appellate military judge.

I. Appointment of Officers of the United States

Article II, § 2, para. 2, clause 2 of the Constitution – the Appointments Clause – provides that the President

> shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law; but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.

The purpose of the Appointments Clause is twofold: (1) it protects the prerogative of the President from congressional encroachment on his power to appoint his subordinates; and (2) "it limits the universe of eligible recipients of the power to appoint." *Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue*, 111 S. Ct. 2631, 2639, 115 L. Ed. 2d 764 (1991). Appellant argues that this second purpose, a limitation on the power to appoint, is violated by Articles 26 and 66 because they vest the appointment power in the Judge Advocate General rather than the President, the Courts of Law, or the head of a department.

The first question we must address is whether the Appointments Clause is applicable to the military justice system. Government counsel have not disputed this applicability of the Appointments Clause. Counsel for the

United States Coast Guard, appearing as amicus curiae, argue that the Appointments Clause does not apply to the military justice system because that system is created pursuant to the plenary power of Congress "to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces," U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 14, and that the Supreme Court grants great deference to Congress in the exercise of that power. *See United States v. Kovac*, 36 M.J. 521, 522-23 (CGCMR 1992); *United States v. Prive*, 35 M.J. 569, 573-77 (CGCMR 1992).

We agree that "judicial deference . . . is at its apogee" when the authority of Congress to govern the land and naval forces is challenged. *Solorio v. United States*, 483 U.S. 435, 447, 107 S. Ct. 2924, 2931, 97 L. Ed. 2d 364 (1987). Nevertheless, congressional authority to raise, support, and govern the armed forces is separate from the authority to appoint Officers of the United States. Judicial deference is granted only to the former, a legislative power conferred by Article I of the Constitution. The appointment of Officers of the United States is an Executive power, conferred by Article II and controlled by the Appointments Clause, from which the armed forces are not exempt, either expressly or by implication.

In *Buckley v. Valeo*, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1976), the Supreme Court held that the plenary power of Congress over federal election practices did not exempt members of the Federal Election Commission from the Appointments Clause. The Supreme Court explained:

> The position that because Congress has been given explicit and plenary authority to regulate a field of activity, it must therefore have the power to appoint those who are to administer the regulatory statute is both novel and contrary to the language of the Appointments Clause. Unless their selection is elsewhere

> provided for, *all* Officers of the United States are to be appointed in accordance with the Clause . . . No class or type of officer is excluded because of its special functions.

Id. at 132, 96 S. Ct. at 688. Thus, we are compelled to conclude that, while Congress may determine how the military justice system will operate, it may not exempt those who will operate it from the Appointments Clause. Accordingly, we hold that the Appointments Clause is applicable to the military justice system.

The next question is whether the duties imposed on military judges by Articles 26 and 66 must be performed by an Officer of the United States, as that term is used in the Appointments Clause. Appellant contends, and we agree, that judicial duties may be performed only by "Officers of the United States," appointed in a manner consistent with the Appointments Clause. *See Freytag v. C.I.R.*, 111 S. Ct. 2631, 115 L. Ed. 2d 764 (1991) (special trial judges of Tax Court); *Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States*, 282 U.S. 344, 51 S. Ct. 153, 75 L. Ed. 374 (1931) (United States commissioners). *See also Buckley v. Valeo*, 424 U.S. at 126, 96 S. Ct. at 685 ("Any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an 'Officer of the United States,' and must, therefore, be appointed" in accordance with the Appointments Clause.)

All military trial judges and most appellate military judges are commissioned officers of their respective armed forces. Commissioned officers of the armed forces are "Officers of the United States." *See Wood v. United States*, 107 U.S. 414, 417, 2 S. Ct. 551, 554, 27 L. Ed. 542 (1883). All regular officers of the military services are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. *See* 10 USC § 531; *see also* 14 USC §§ 211 and 212 regarding appointment of regular Coast Guard officers. Reserve of-

ficers above the grade of major/lieutenant commander are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. *See* 10 USC §§ 593 and 5912. Active duty military officers are appointed and confirmed again upon each promotion to a grade above pay grade 0-3. *See* 10 USC § 624 (promotion of active-duty regular and reserve officers of the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps).

If judicial duties may be performed only by Officers of the United States, and military officers are Officers of the United States, the next question is whether military officers may perform judicial duties without a new "judicial" appointment. In *Shoemaker v. United States*, 147 U.S. 282, 13 S. Ct. 361, 37 L. Ed. 170 (1893), the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the nature and scope of the office held by military officers. The Supreme Court held that two military officers, the Chief of Engineers and the Engineer Commissioner for the District of Columbia, did not require second appointments as members of a commission created by Congress to select land for Rock Creek Park in the District of Columbia, survey it, map it, and determine the just compensation to be paid by the United States upon its condemnation. Justice Shiras explained:

> As, however, the two persons whose eligibility is questioned were at the time of the passage of the act and of their action under it officers of the United States who had been theretofore appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, we do not think that, because additional duties, germane to the offices already held by them, were devolved upon them by the act, it was necessary that they should be again appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.

He went on to define "germane" broadly, observing:

> It is true that it may be sometimes difficult to say whether a given duty, devolved by statute upon a

> named officer, has regard to the civil or military service of the United States. *Wales v. Whitney*, 114 U.S. 564, 569 [5 S. Ct. 1050, 1052, 29 L. Ed. 277 (1885)]; *Smith v. Whitney*, 116 U.S. 167, 179, 181 [6 S. Ct. 570, 576, 577, 298 L. Ed. 601 (1886)]. But, in the present case, the duty which the military officers in question were called upon to perform cannot fairly be said to have been dissimilar to, or outside of the sphere of, their official duties.

147 U.S. at 301, 13 S. Ct. at 391.

Appellant argues that "the offices already held by them" were the specific offices of Chief of Engineers and Engineer Commissioner for the District of Columbia, and not the underlying office of military officer. A careful reading of *Shoemaker* requires that we reject that argument for two reasons. First, *Shoemaker* specifically referred to "the duty which the *military officers* . . . were called upon to perform." (Emphasis added.) Second, the two cases cited in *Shoemaker* both dealt with the scope of military duties in general, not the specific duties of the positions held by the military officers. *Wales* addressed the question whether the medical duties of the Navy Surgeon General were "military" as opposed to "civil" duties. *Smith* addressed the issue whether the fiscal duties of the Navy Paymaster-General were of a civil or military nature.

The principle we glean from *Shoemaker* is that Congress may create a new office (*e.g.*, Rock Creek Park Commissioner) and give a military officer the duties of that office without making a new appointment necessary, if the new duties are "germane" to the military duties of that officer. Applied to this case, it means that a second "judicial" appointment is not required if: (1) Congress did not create a new "office"; or (2) Congress created a new office, but the

duties of that office are "germane" to the duties of the military officer detailed to perform them. A second appointment would be required if Congress created a new office and the duties of that office were not germane to the duties of the military officer detailed to perform them.

II. Military Judges

A court-martial is a temporary court, called into existence by a military order and disssolved when its purpose is accomplished. *See* Arts. 22, 23, and 24, UCMJ, 10 USC § 822, 823, and 824, respectively (prescribing who may convene courts-martial). Its constitutional origin is based on the congressional authority to govern the armed forces set out in Article 1, § 8, clause 14. As Colonel Winthrop explains, "Courts-martial of the United States, although their legal sanction is no less than that of the federal courts, being equally with these authorized by the Constitution, are, unlike these, not a portion of the Judiciary of the United States, and are thus not included among the 'inferior' courts which Congress 'may from time to time ordain and establish.' " W. Winthrop, *Military Law and Precedents* 49 (2d ed. 1920 Reprint).

Military judges perform duties prescribed by statute and the exeuctive order when detailed to a specific court-martial. *See* Art. 26; Exec. Order No. 12473, April 13, 1984, 49 FR 17,152 (promulgating the new Manual for Courts-Martial); RCM 801-1011, 1102, 1104, Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1984. Military judges have no inherent judicial authority separate from a court-martial to which they have been detailed. When they act, they do so as a court-martial, not as a military judge. Until detailed to a specific court-martial, they have no more authority than any other military officer of the same grade and rank. To the extent that they perform judicial duties such as authorizing searches and reviewing pretrial con-

finement, their authority is not inherent but is either delegated or granted by executive order. *See* Mil.R.Evid 315 (d)(2), Manual, *supra* (military judge may authorize searches if authorized by regulations of Secretary of Defense or Secretary concerned); RCM 305(g) (military judge may release from confinement); RCM 305 (i)(2) and RCM 305(j) (military judge may review propriety of pretrial confinement).

To resolve the granted issue with respect to military judges, we must answer two questions: (1) Did Article 26 create a new office of "military judge"?; and (2) If so, are the duties of the new office germane to the duties of the military officer detailed as a military judge of a general court-martial or special court-martial?

A. New Office

After examining the history and evolution of the military judge, set out in greater detail below, we conclude that Congress did not create a new "office" when it enacted: the Articles of War (AW) in 1920 (requiring that a "law member" be detailed to every general court-martial – AW 8); or the Uniform Code of Military Justice of 1950 (requiring detail of a "law officer" to every general court-martial – Art. 26, 50 USC § 590); or the Uniform Code of Military Justice of 1968 (redesignating the law officer as the military judge – Art. 26, 10 USC § 826).

As the position of military judge has evolved, the military judge has acquired virtually all the duties previously performed by the president and members of a court-martial. Prior to the 1920 amendments to the Articles of War, the president of a court-martial, who usually was not a lawyer, presided over the trial. *See* para. 89, Manual for Courts-Martial, U.S. Army, 1917. In 1920, AW 8 was amended to require that a "law member" be

detailed to general courts-martial in the Army. 41 Stat. 787, 788. AW 31 was amended in 1920 to transfer some duties of the president to the law member. It also provided that the law member ruled finally on questions of admissibility of evidence but could be overruled by a majority of the court members on other interlocutory questions. Until 1951, the Navy and Coast Guard continued the pre-1920 practice of using non-lawyers to preside over courts-martial and decide interlocutory questions. *See* §§ 381 and 370, Naval Courts and Boards, 1937; para. 385(t), Manual for Courts-Martial, U.S. Coast Guard, 1949 at 134.

When the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Pub.L. No. 81-506, 64b Stat. 108, codified in 50 USC §§ 551-736, recodified in 10 USC §§ 801-940 (1956), became effective in May 1951, the law member was redesignated as the law officer and additional duties were transferred from the president of the court to the law officer. All military services were required to "appoint" a law officer to general courts-martial. *See* Art. 26. Nonlawyers continued to preside over special courts-martial, Art. 51, UCMJ, 50 USC § 626, recodified in 10 USC § 851 (1956). This changed when the Military Justice Act of 1968, Pub.L. No. 90-632, § 2(9), 82 Stat. 1335, 1336, became effective in August 1969.

The Military Justice Act of 1968 changed the title of the law officer to military judge, in order to increase his stature, and transferred more duties from the president of the court-martial to the military judge. *See* Art. 26, 82 Stat. 1336. Since the Act merely transferred authority and duties from one official of the court-martial to another and renamed the law officer, it did not create a new office.[2]

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[2] In *United States v. Graf, supra,* this Court said, in dicta, *id.* at 455, that Congress "created" the military judge and the Courts of

As the Supreme Court explained in *Shoemaker*, "It cannot be doubted, and it has frequently been the case, that Congress may increase the power and duties of an existing office without thereby rendering it necessary that the incumbent should be again nominated and appointed." 147 U.S. at 301, 13 S. Ct. at 391.

The Military Justice Act of 1968 also amended Article 16, UCMJ, 10 USC § 816, to authorize an accused to request trial by a court-martial composed of only a military judge. 82 Stat. 1335. When trying a case without members, the military judge sits as a one-member court-martial. A one-member court-martial was not new to military justice. *See* Art. 16(3), UCMJ, 50 USC § 576 (1950), recodified in 10 USC § 816(3) (1956) (summary court-martial); AW 7 (1916) (summary court-martial); Art. 64(b), Articles for the Government of the Navy (AGN) (1909) (deck court). When sitting as a one-member general court-martial or special court-martial to which he is detailed, not from his status as a military judge. His authority is limited to that of the court-martial to which he has been detailed, and he may act only with respect to the cases referred to that court-martial. We conclude that the amendment of Article 16 did not create a new office but merely altered the composition of general courts-martial and special courts-martial.

Likewise, the amendment of Article 39(a), UCMJ, 10 USC § 839 (a), effective in 1969, authorizing the military judge to hold sessions outside the presence of the members

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Military Review by enacting the Military Justice Act of 1968. We do not intend this imprecise dicta to hold that Congress created a new "office" in 1969, when the Act became effective.

Contrary to a dissenter's assertion that this view demeans military judges (36 MJ at 260 (Wiss, J., dissenting)), we believe that our opinion merely recognizes the awesome life-and-death authority traditionally entrusted to military officers.

to dispose of interlocutory motions, arraign the accused, receive pleas, and dispose of other procedural matters not requiring the presence of the members, did not create a new office. The purpose and effect of Article 39(a) was to avoid wasting the time of the members by requiring them to sit idly by while the military judge disposed of legal and procedural issues. S.Rep. No. 1601, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1968), U.S. Code Cong. & Admins. News 1968, 4501. Article 39(a) did not confer new duties on the military judge; it merely authorized him to discharge those duties without wasting the time of the court members.

Since a new office was not created by the Military Justice Act of 1968, a second "judicial" appointment was not necessary for military judges. Accordingly, we hold that the military judge in appellant's case was not appointed in violation of the Appointments Clause.

B. Germane Duties

Assuming, *arguendo*, that a new office was created at some time during the evolution of the military judge, the result is the same, because the duties of the military judge are the same as those traditionally performed by military officers serving as members of courts-martial. As such, they are germane to the duties of a legally trained military officer. *Shoemaker v. United States*, 147 U.S. 282, 13 S. Ct. 361, 37 L. Ed. 170. Just as the duties of a Rock Creek Park Commissioner were germane to the duties of a military engineer, presiding over courts-martial is clearly germane to the duties of a military lawyer. Accordingly, a new appointment would not be required even if a new office was created.

III. Appellate Military Judges

In order to resolve the granted issue with respect to appellate military judges, we must address three questions:

(1) Did Congress create a new office?; (2) If Congress created a new office, are the duties of that office germane to the duties of the military officer detailed to perform them?; and (3) What is the significance of the provision in Article 66(a) authorizing civilian members on boards of review and their successors, the Courts of Military Review?

A. New Office

Appellant contends that Congress established a new office by creating an intermediate appellate court for each service. We hold that a new office was created when boards of review were established.

Prior to 1920, there were no appellate military courts. Appellate review of courts-martial was accomplished by a hierarchy of reviewing, supervisory, and confirming authorities, all of whom were military commanders, cabinet officers, or the President. In 1920, the Articles of War, applicable only to the Army, were amended by enactment of AW 50 1/2, which mandated: "The Judge Advocate General shall constitute, in his office, a board of review consisting of not less than three officers of the Judge Advocate General's Department." The board of review was required to examine every record of trial involving a sentence which required "approval or confirmation by the President." Furthermore, "execution of any . . . sentence of a general court-martial involving the penalty of death, dismissal not suspended, dishonorable discharge not suspended, or confinement in a penitentiary," required review by the board of review and the Judge Advocate General. If the Judge Advocate General disagreed with the decision of the board of review, the record would be transmitted to the Secretary of War for the action of the President. AW 50 1/2. On the

other hand, special courts-martial and summary courts-martial were reviewed only by the officer appointing the court. AW 36 (1920). After the 1948 amendments of the Articles of War, effective February 1, 1949, certain Army and Air Force general court-martial cases were reviewed by a board of review, a Judicial Council composed of three general officers of the Judge Advocate General's Corps, and the Judge Advocate General. *See* AW 50 (1948).

Prior to 1951, a Navy general court-martial was reviewed by "the commander of the fleet or officer ordering the court." 53d AGN (1934). A summary court-martial (the counterpart of the modern special court-martial) was reviewed "by the officer ordering the court . . . and by his immediate superior in command." 32d AGN. A sentence "extending to the loss of life, or to the dismissal of a commissioned or warrant officer" required confirmation by the President. 53d AGN. A deck court (the counterpart to the modern summary court-martial) was reviewed by the officer who ordered it. AGN 64(d). Reviewing authorities were required to examine jurisdictional issues, the legal sufficiency of the pleadings, objections to evidence, and the legal sufficiency of the evidence. See, e.g., § 472, Naval Courts and Boards, 1937.

Prior to 1951, a Coast Guard deck court was reviewed "by the officer ordering" it and then was forwarded to Coast Guard Headquarters, where it was "reviewed for legality . . . with the same force and effect as though an appeal had been taken." The Commandant of the Coast Guard was authorized to take whatever action "the interests of justice and equity may require." The accused had a "right to appeal to the Secretary of the Treasury from a decision of a deck court." Arts. 31 and 36, Manual for Courts-Martial, U.S. Coast Guard, 1949. All other courts-martial were reviewed by the Secretary of the Treasury,

and the President in the case of dismissal of an officer. 14 USC § 564(d)(1949); Art. 140, Manual, USCG, *supra*. No Coast Guard court-martial could impose a sentence exceeding a discharge, confinement for 5 years, forfeiture, and reduction. 14 USC § 564(b) and (c); *see* Art. 50, Manual, USCG, *supra*.

After the Uniform Code of Military Justice became effective in 1951, convening authorities in all services retained the authority and responsibility to review the record of trial for legal sufficiency. *See* Art. 64, 50 USC § 651, recodified in 10 USC § 864 (1956) ("The convening authority shall approve only such findings of guilty, and the sentence or such part or amount of the sentence, as he finds correct in law and fact. . . .").

The 1950 Code made boards of review mandatory for the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. They were already mandatory for the Army by virtue of AW 50 1/2, enacted in 1920. This AW was made applicable to the Air Force by 62 Stat. 1014 (1948), codified in 5 USC § 627k (1948). Article 66(a) (1950) mandated;

> The Judge Advocate General of each of the armed forces shall constitute in his office one or more boards of review, each composed of not less than three officers or civilians, each of whom shall be a member of the bar of a Federal court or of the highest court of a State of the United States.

Effective in 1969, Article 66(a) was revised to its present language, as follows:

> Each Judge Advocate General shall establish a Court of Military Review which shall be composed of one or more panels, and each such panel shall be composed of not less than three appellate military judges . . . . Appellate military judges who are assigned to a Court of Military Review may be commissioned officers or

> civilians, each of whom must be a member of a bar of a Federal court or of the highest court of a State . . . .

Boards of Review were a new entity, created by Congress for the Army in 1920, the Air Force in 1948, and the Naval services in 1951. For the first time, there was a level of formal appellate review beyond the officer who convened the general court-martial. Also, for the first time, a permanent military tribunal was established, as compared to courts-martial which are temporary entities. Article 66 vested no discretion in the Judge Advocates General; boards of review were mandatory. We are satisfied that Congress, acting indirectly through the Judge Advocates General, created a new office by establishing boards of review. *Cf. Dettinger v. United States*, 7 M.J. 216 (CMA 1979) (Congress, acting through Judge Advocate General, created Court of Military Review).

Unlike the Court of Military Appeals, created in 1950 as an instrument of civilian oversight imposed upon the military services, the boards of review were intended as military tribunals constituted by competent military authority from within each service. The mandate to each Judge Advocate General to "constitute" boards of review was consistent with the traditional practice of vesting the authority and responsibility for constituting military tribunals in military officers and giving them the authority to appoint the members.

That Congress intended the boards of review to be tribunals of a different nature from the Court of Military Appeals is apparent both from the language of the statutes creating them and the legislative history. The statute first creating the Court of Military Appeals used traditional language for creating a civilian Article I court: "There is hereby established a Court of Military Appeals . . . ." Art. 67(a)(1), 64 Stat. 129 (1950). In 1969 the provision was

amended to read: "There is a United States Court of Military Appeals established under article I of the Constitution of the United States . . . ." Finally, in Article 141, 10 USC § 941 (1989) Congress described the Court's status as follows: "There is a court of record known as the United States Court of Military Appeals. The court is established under article I of the Constitution." This is virtually the identical language used by Congress to create other Article I courts. *See* 26 USC § 7441 ("There is hereby established, under article I of the Constitution of the United States, a court of record to be known as the United States Tax Court."); 38 USC § 7251 ("There is hereby established, under Article I of the Constitution of the United States, a court of record to be known as the United States Court of Veterans Appeals."). The language creating the boards of review was substantially different: "The Judge Advocate General of each of the armed forces shall constitute in his office one or more boards of review. . . ." 50 USC § 653 (1950), recodified in 10 USC § 866 (1956).

This difference in language was not accidental. Indeed, in 1966, Senator Sam Ervin held hearings on a bill to establish a Court of Military Review in each service which would have been appointed by the service secretary and whose judges, both military and civilian, would have served for a fixed term of office. That bill used language similar to the organic statutes for the Court of Military Appeals, the Tax Court, and the Court of Veterans Appeals. It would have amended Article 66(a) to read: 'There is established for each military department an appellate court. . . . Each such court is a court of record and shall be known as the Court of Military Review for the military department for which it is established." Joint Hearings before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Comm. and the Special Subcomm. of the

Senate Armed Services Comm., 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 497-98 (1966). The bill was not enacted. Two years later, Article 66(a) in its present form was enacted.

The Senate Hearings on the 1950 Code reveal the intent of the drafters to use military expertise on the boards of review. The following exchange between Senator Kefauver and Professor Morgan is instructive:

> SENATOR KEFAUVER. . . . May I ask at this point, was there any difference of opinion on the part of the committee or extensive discussion as to whether each service should have its own reviewing section?
>
> MR. MORGAN. No; the committee was unanimous on that, so far as the board of review is concerned.
>
> The notion was that each service would know more about the customs of the service, and all that sort of thing, and that the Judge Advocate General of that particular service would be the man that would be most competent to handle that thing from the point of view of this board of review, because the board of review, now, has very extensive powers.

Hearings on S. 857 and H.R. 4080 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Armed Services Comm., 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1949).

The amendments enacted in 1968 to Article 66(a) did not change the character of authority of the boards of review but merely completed the evolution by calling them what they were: appellate courts composed of appellate military judges. The legislative history of the 1968 amendment reflects that the redesignation of boards of review as a Court of Military Review was only a name change, designed to enhance the stature of the board of review by calling it a court and calling its members judges. This change was consistent with redesignating law officers as

military judges. *See* S.Rep. No. 1601, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 14 (1968); The Army Lawyer: A History of The Judge Advocate General's Corps, 1775-1975 at 247 (U.S. Govt. Printing Office). Certain organizational changes were mandated to improve efficiency and protect the independence of appellate military judges; but now new appointment procedures for appellate military judges were established.

B. Germane Duties

Turning to the second question, we observe that military officers traditionally have been responsible for legal review of court-martial convictions in their capacities as reviewing and supervisory authorities. Prior to the creation of boards of review, military commanders were responsible for the legal review of courts-martial convened by them or their subordinates. *See* 53d AGN (1934) (record reviewed by "commander of the fleet or officer ordering the court"); 32d AGN (1934) (summary court-martial reviewed by "officer ordering the court" and "his immediate superior in command"); AW 46 and 47 (1920) (record reviewed by convening authority); AW 46 and 47 (1920) (record reviewed by convening authority); para. 35, Manual for Courts-Martial, U.S. Coast Guard, 1949 (deck court reviewed by Commandant of Coast Guard); § 472, Naval Courts and Boards, 1937 (commander reviewing the record must examine jurisdictional issues, legal sufficiency of pleadings, objections to evidence, and legal sufficiency of evidence).

A cadre of legally trained officers existed in each of the services prior to 1920. The language of Article of War 50 1/2 and Article 66 of the Code reflect that Congress had this cadre of legally trained officers in mind when boards of review were first created in 1920 and extended to all the

services in 1951. Congress considered the duties of the boards of review not only germane to military duties, but particularly appropriate for military lawyers. We hold that the duties of the newly-created boards of review were "germane" to the duties of the legally trained military officers contemplated by AW 50 1/2 and Article 66 of the Code; therefore, we hold that a second judicial appointment is unnecessary.

C. Civilian Members

Turning finally to the significance of the provision for civilian members, the legislative history of Article 66(a) reflects that the historical antecedent of the boards of review created by Article 66(a) was the Army board of review, composed of military officers, which was created by AW 50 1/2. The provision for civilian members was not included in AW 50 1/2, but was added to Article 66(a) at the request of the Coast Guard. During the 1949 hearings on the proposed Uniform Code of Military Justice, Mr. Larkin explained the provision for civilian members as follows:

> Well, they were included initially at the request of the Coast Guard—not that it be worded this specific way but the Coast Guard does have civilian lawyers working in their court-martial procedures during peacetime, and they feel they are very competent. They don't have an unusually large number of officers in their review, and they wanted to be free if they desired to appoint a civilian lawyer working for the Coast Guard to a board of review. This was the easiest way to make that provision.

Hearings on H.R. 2498 before a Subcomm. of the House Armed Services Comm., 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1189 (1949), *reprinted in Index and Legislative History, Uniform Code of Military Justice* (1950).

In appellant's case we need not decide whether Congress inadvertently exceeded its authority by vesting the power of an "Officer of the United States" in civilians who had not been appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause, because no civilians participated in the appellate review of his case. We regard the provision for civilian members of boards of review and their successors, the Courts of Military Review, as severable from the remainder of Article 66(a). Congress had two purposes in enacting Article 66(a). The primary purpose was to make boards of review mandatory for all services. The secondary purpose was to accommodate the Coast Guard by authorizing civilian members on boards of review. Where a statute attempts to accomplish two or more objects, it may be valid as to one and invalid as to others, as long as its purpose can be accomplished by the valid part and is not dependent upon or conditioned by the invalid part. *Sutherland Stat. Const.* § 44.07 at 503-04 (4th Ed.1986 Revision).

D. Conclusion

Applying the *Shoemaker* analysis to appellant's case, we hold that appellate military judges need not be reappointed to perform judicial duties because judicial duties are "germane" to the offices already held by them as legally trained commissioned officers of their respective armed forces. Accordingly, we hold that appointment of the appellate military judges who reviewed appellant's case was consistent with the Appointments Clause.

We have not addressed the desirability of a legislative requirement that trial and appellate military judges be specifically appointed as judges by the President, a Court of Law, or the Head of a Department, and we consider it inappropriate to do so. Congress has the power to require a second "judicial" appointment if considered desirable. Congress considered such a measure in 1966 but did not

enact it. We decide only that a second "judicial" appointment was not constitutionally required for the trial and appellate judges involved in appellant's case. As we stated in *United States v. Henderson*, 34 M.J. 174, 178 (CMA 1992), "As a court . . . we are not involved in the merits of . . . policy. We interpret statutes, and we can strike them down only when they violate the Constitution.

The decisions of the United States Navy—Marine Corps Court of Military Review is affirmed.

Judge COX concurs.

CRAWFORD, Judge (concurring in the result):

The lead opinion has put forward a thoughtful and well-reasoned analysis of how Article II, section 2, paragraph 2, clause 2, of the United States Constitution is not violated by the present manner of selecting military judges. However, I part ways with the underlying premise of the lead opinion that the Appointments Clause applies to the selection of a military judiciary and therefore can only concur in the result.

In concluding that the Appointments Clause does not apply either to selection of military trial or military appellate judges, one of necessity must engage in both an historical and a contemporary analysis of the Constitution and its Appointments Clause. In applying both approaches, the intentions of the Framers can be determined from documents that are available. *See e.g.*, 4 P. Kurland & R. Lerner, *The Founders' Constitution* (hereafter Kurland) (1987); J. Harris, *The Advice and Consent of the Senate* (hereafter Harris) 25-30 (1953).

A. The Historical Approach

At the time of the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia from late May to mid-September 1787, no thought was given to how the Appointments Clause

should be applied to military trial and appellate judges. Kurland, *supra* at 28-38. Two major themes dominated the debates which shaped the Appointments Clause. First, those who opposed a strong executive resisted giving the chief executive the nomination authority over the national judiciary without some sort of Council to screen the appointment process. Second, those who opposed a strong legislature feared that if the appointment authority was given to the legislative branch, the appointment of a national judiciary would fall into the hands of certain factions. Harris, *supra* at 25-30.

At the time of these debates there was no military judiciary in place, that function being served by military officers. There was, however, a great deal of debate and attention paid to a federal civilian judiciary as evidenced by Alexander Hamilton's discussions in *The Federalist Papers*, Nos. 78 through 83.[1] Thus, historically, the

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[1] No. 78, "A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT IN RELATION TO THE TENURE OF GOOD BEHAVIOR," wherein Hamilton discusses "the doctrine of judicial review," stating: "Whenever a particular statute contravenes the Constitution, it will be the duty of the judicial tribunals to adhere to the letter and disregard the former."

No. 79, "A FURTHER VIEW OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT IN RELATION TO THE PROVISIONS FOR THE SUPPORT AND RESPONSIBILITY OF THE JUDGES," wherein Hamilton expresses "thoughts on the salary, tenure, accountability, and age of judges."

No. 80, "A FURTHER VIEW OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT IN RELATION TO THE EXTENT OF ITS POWERS," wherein "Hamilton traces the outlines of the judicial power."

No. 81, "A FURTHER VIEW OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT IN RELATION TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF ITS AUTHORITY," wherein Hamilton "states the case for a distinct, learned, independent Supreme Court, then speculates on the relations of the Supreme Court to the lower courts."

No. 82, "A FURTHER VIEW OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT IN REFERENCE TO SOME MISCELLANEOUS QUES-

Founding Fathers gave no explicit consideration to including a military judiciary within the ambit of the Appointments Clause.

B. The Contemporary Approach

A contemporary approach to reviewing our Constitution and its provisions looks at the intent of the Framers and the interests and values they meant to protect. A contemporary reading of the Constitution is important because as John Marshall stated: "It is a constitution we are expounding." *McCulloch v. Maryland*, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (4 Wheat.), 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819). The Constitution is a living document and "states or ought to state not rules for the passing hour, but principles for an expanding future," B. Cardozo, *The Nature of the Judicial Process* 83 (Yale Univ. Press 1921), and "a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth." *Weems v. United States*, 217 U.S. 349, 373, 30 S. Ct. 544, 551, 54 L. Ed. 793 (1910).

Utilizing a contemporary analysis I start by asking what interest and values were meant to be protected by the Appointments Clause. It is undisputed that the Appointments Clause was designed as a series of checks and balances between the Executive and Legislative Branches on the creation and filling of offices. Kurland, *supra*, 424 U.S at 33. The Framers were concerned with a division of power to prevent one branch from becoming more powerful than the other.

TIONS," wherein Hamilton discusses "the relations of the federal and State courts."

No. 83, "A FURTHER VIEW OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT IN RELATION TO THE TRIAL BY JURY," wherein "Hamilton attempts . . . to quiet the fears of" some with a discussion "of this ancient 'palladium of free government.' "

The Federalist Papers, xxx-xxxi (A. Hamilton, J. Madison, J. Jay) (C. Rossiter 1961).

The debates among the Framers over appointments authority in general and judicial appointments in particular bear out their desire for checks and balances as well as for qualified appointees. Edmund Randolph of Virginia argued that if appointment authority was in the legislative branch, this "generally resulted from cabal, from personal regard, or some other consideration that a title derived from the proper qualification." Whereas George Mason, also of Virginia, argued that, if the appointment to the judiciary was with the executive, it was "a dangerous prerogative. It might even give him an influence over the Judiciary department itself." *Id.* at 33.

Alexander Hamilton of New York thought that giving the Senate approval authority over nominations would be a check on the "spirit of favoritism of the President" and would work against the appointment of unqualified individuals or individuals selected because of a family connection or personal attachment, Harris, *supra* at 28. Hamilton argued that to empower the legislature with appointment authority would just lead to "intrigue and cabal." *Id. Cf.* Kurland, *supra* at 31. Nathaniel J. Ghorum (also spelled Gorham in some texts) of Massachusetts thought it best that the Executive be responsible for appointment because "he will be careful to look through all the States for proper characters." *Id.* at 31. To prevent dependency on a single individual making the appointment, some Framers thought it best to have the Senate vote on the appointments. Others were concerned that a Senate vote would mean too "much fettering [in] the Senate." *Id.* at 32. Eventually the Framers settled on appointments by the executive with the advice and consent of the Senate.

In defense of the appointment power enunciated in the Constitution. Alexander Hamilton in *The Federalist* No. 66 commented as follows on how the appointment power would work:

> It will be the office of the president to *nominate*, and with the advice and consent of the senate to *appoint*. There will of course be no exertion of *choice* on the part of the senate. They may defeat one choice of the executive, and oblige him to make another; but they cannot themselves *choose*—they can only ratify or reject the choice, he may have made. They might even entertain a preference to some other person, at the very moment they were assenting to the one proposed; because there might be no positive ground of opposition to him; and they could not be sure, if they withheld their assent, that the subsequent nomination would fall upon their own favourite, or upon any other person in their estimation more meritorious than the one rejected. Thus it could hardly happen that the majority of the senate would feel any other complacency towards the object of an appointment, than such, as the appearances of merit, might inspire, and the proofs of the want of it, destroy.

The Federalist: A Collection of Essays Written in Favour of The New Constitution, vol. II at 218-19 (J. and A. McLean, New York, 1788)(hereafter cited at McLean).

Thus the interests and values of providing for the selection of officers, including judicial officers, based on merit and dividing power between the executive and legislative branches gave birth to the Appointments Clause. The question remains whether, in order to protect those interests and values, it is necessary to select military trial and appellate judges pursuant to the Appointments Clause. In order to answer that question we must also examine the additional interests and values unique to national security and military matters which the Framers sought to protect. In doing so we can determine whether these other factors justify civilian judiciary and thereby render the Appointments Clause inapplicable to military judges.

C. Analysis

Because of national security interests and concerns for unforeseen military exigencies, it was the intent of the Framers to vest great authority over these matters in Congress. L. Tribe, *American Constitutional Law* 353-56 (2d ed.1988). They accomplished this in the Constitution through the enumerated powers of Article I, Section 8, Clauses 11 through 16 and 18. Under the enumerated powers, Congress has the power to "raise and support Armies" (cl. 12); "provide and maintain a Navy" (cl. 13); "make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces" (cl. 14); and "make all laws that are . . . . necessary and proper" (cl. 18).

The rationale for this approach by the Framers is found in Alexander Hamilton's Federalist No. 23:

> The authorities essential to the care of the common defence are these—to raise armies—to build and equip fleets—to prescribe rules for the government of both—to direct their operations—to provide for their support. These powers ought to exist without limitation: *Because it is impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of national exigencies, and the correspondent extent and variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them.* [*] The circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite; and for this reason, no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is committed. This power ought to be coextensive with all the possible combinations of such circumstances; and ought to be under the direction of the same councils, which are appointed to preside over the common defense.
>
> * * *
>
> Whether there ought to be a federal government intrusted with the care of the common defence is a ques-

> tion, in the first instance, open to discussion; but the moment it is decided in the affirmative, it will follow, that that government ought to be cloathed with all the powers requisite to the complete execution of its trust. And unless it can be shewn, that the circumstances which may effect the public safety are reducible within certain determinate limits; unless the contrary of this position can be fairly and rationally disputed, it must be admitted as a necessary consequence, that there can be no limitation of that authority, which is to provide for the defence and protection of the community, in any matter essential to its efficacy; that is, in any matter essential to the *formation, direction* or *support* of the NATIONAL FORCES.

McClean, *supra*, vol. I at 144-45 (some emphasis [*] added).

This view was underscored by James Madison in The Federalist No. 41:

> But was it necessary to give an INDEFINITE POWER of raising TROOPS, as well as providing fleets; and of maintaining both in PEACE, as well as in WAR?
>
> The answer to these questions has been too far anticipated, in another place, to admit an extensive discussion of them in this place. The answer indeed seems to be so obvious and conclusive as scarcely to justify such a discussion in any place. With what colour of propriety could the force necessary for defence, be limited by those who cannot limit the force of offence? If a federal Constitution could chain the ambition, or set bounds to the exertions of all other nations, then indeed might it prudently chain the discretion of its own government, and set bounds to the exertions for its own safety.

McLean, supra, vol. II at 39.

Yet the Framers, mindful of the new nation's fears regarding establishment of a standing armed force in peacetime, S. Padover, *To Secure These Blessings* 203-08 (1962), did not propose to give the new executive and legislature this great authority without some limitation. Article I, Section 8, Clause 12, gives Congress the authority to "raise and support Armies" but also provides that "no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years." In *The Federalist* No. 26, Alexander Hamilton puts forth a spirited defense of this clause that limits appropriations for military purposes to two Years:

> The legislature of the United States will be *obliged* by this provision, once at least in every two years, to deliberate upon the propriety of keeping a military force on foot; to come to a new resolution on the point; and to declare their sense of the matter, by a formal vote in the face of their constituents. They are not *at liberty* to vest in the executive department permanent funds for the support of an army; if they were even incautious enough to be willing to repose in it so improper a confidence. As the spirit of party in different degrees, must be expected to infect all political bodies, there will be no doubt persons in the national legislature willing enough to arraign the measures and criminate the views of the majority. The provision for the support of a military force will always be a favourable topic for declamation. As often as the question comes forward, the public attention will be roused and attracted to the subject, by the party in opposition: And if the majority should be really disposed to exceed the proper limits, the community will be warned of the danger, and will have an oppor-

> tunity of taking measures to guard against it. Independent of parties in the national legislature itself, as often as the period of discussion arrived, the state legislatures, who will always be not only vigilant, but suspicious and jealous guardians of the rights of the citizens, against incroachments from the federal government, will constantly have their attention awake to the conduct of the national rulers, and will be ready enough, if any thing improper appears, to sound the alarm to the people, and not only to be the VOICE, but, if necessary, the ARM of their discontent

McLean *supra,* vol. I at 165-66.

An examination of the military judiciary, although similar to its civilian counterpart in the importance and scope of its duties, also reveals marked dissimilarities from a civilian judiciary because of the ever-existent potential for military exigencies. "Military exigencies" is not a term of art; our armed forces are not a garrison force. In the past 4 years alone, our military men and women have deployed to Panama in Operation Just Cause and to Southwest Asia in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. In addition, they have participated in the humanitarian mission to aid Kurdish refugees, Operation Provide Comfort, following Operation Desert Storm. Even as this opinion is being released, our troops are serving in Somalia as part of a relief effort called Operation Restore Hope.

These missions require worldwide deployment and the need for instant mobility and flexibility in assignments, including military judge assignments. Military judges must try cases in combat environments, and, due to the potential for military judge casualties, replacements must be available at a moment's notice. The ever-expanding role of

the military only underscores the wisdom of our Founding Fathers in entrusting Congress with the authority and responsibility for providing for its day-to-day operations.[2]

In carrying out its enumerated responsibilities Congress has paid careful attention to the military justice system. Starting in 1950 with the adoption of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Congress has been very active in expanding the status and power of the military judge. In 1950, Congress provided for the law officer who was the forerunner of the military trial judge. *See* Pub.L. No. 81-506, 64 Stat. 117. In the Military Justice Act of 1968, Pub.L. No. 90-632, 82 Stat. 1335, Congress provided for military judges (at 1336) and the Courts of Military Review (at 1341). See generally Cox, *The Army, The Courts, and The Constitution: The Evolution of Military Justice,* 118 Mil.L.Rev. 1 (1987); Criminal Law Note: *An Ongoing Trend: Expanding the Status and Power of the Military Judge,* The Army lawyer 23 (Dept. of the Army Pamphlet 27-50-239, October 1992).

In addition to his or her constitutional role as Commander-in-chief, U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, the President has a specific role for military justice matters. Pursuant to its authority under the Constitution, Congress, through Article 36(a), Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC § 836 (a) (1979), has given the President the authority to prescribe "pretrial, trial, and post-trial pro-

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[2] For example if during Desert Shield/Storm a scud missile hit a barracks housing one or more judges from the services, replacements would be needed immediately. A service Judge Advocate General looking for qualified individuals might select an individual from the Court of Military Review. Likewise, if there was a heavy case load before the Court of Military Review, for example, a series of classified cases, the Judge Advocate General should have the flexibility of assigning a trial judge not involved with those cases to the appellate court.

cedures, including modes of proof, for . . . [trials by] courts-martial." Based on this delegation of authority from Congress, the President has by Executive Order set forth many rules in the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1984, that pertain to the authority of the military judge. *See generally* 1 F. Gilligan and F. Lederer, *Court-Martial Procedure* 514-56 (1991).

In fulfilling its responsibilities, Congress has been mindful of the interests sought to be protected by the Appointments Clause. First, with respect to selection of qualified individuals to serve as military judges, Congress has determined that these assignments be made by the Judge Advocate General of each service who has direct responsibility for military justice within his or her respective service[3] Congress has implicitly recognized that the Judge Advocates General are uniquely situated to determine which officers are best qualified within their respective services to serve as both trial and appellate judges. Moreover, these same individuals have by necessity great flexibility to make these assignments[4] quickly in a combat environment

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[3] Article 26(c), Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC § 826(c), provides: "The military judge of a general court-martial shall be designated by the Judge Advocate General, or his designee, of the armed force of which the military judge is a member. . . ."

Article 66(a), UCMJ, 10 USC § 866(a), provides: "Each Judge Advocate General shall establish a Court of Military Review which shall be composed of one or more panels, and each such panel shall be composed of not less than three appellate military judges."

See also Morgan, *The Background of the Uniform Code of Military Justice*, 6 Vand.L.Rev. 169 (1953); comments, *Military Justice and the Constitution—Improvements Offered by the New Uniform code of Military Justice*, 29 Tex.L.Rev. 651 (1951).

[4] Article 6(a), UCMJ, 10 USC § 806(a), states:

> The assignment for duty of judge advocates of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard shall be made upon the recommendation of the Judge Advocate General of the armed force of

where casualties or other exigencies may affect the military judiciary.

Second, with respect to establishing a system of checks and balances between the Executive and Legislative branches, it is difficult to see how the present system of assigning military judges jeopardizes that delicate balance. If anything, the creation by Congress in 1951 of the United States Court of Military Appeals, a federal civilian court subject to the Appointments Clause, which reviews decisions of the military judiciary, more than satisfies any concerns in that regard. *See* 64 Stat. 129. Additionally, effective August 1, 1984, Congress provided in Article 67(h)(1), UCMJ, 10 USC § 867(h)(1), now Article 67a, UCMJ, 10 USC § 867a (1989), that decisions of our Court are reviewable by the Supreme Court of the United States by writ of certiorari, Military Justice Act. Pub.L. No. 98-209, § 10(c)(2), 97 Stat. 1393, 1406, thereby providing the ultimate check on judicial decisions of the military justice system.

If there is dissatisfaction with the military justice system as it exists today, it can be changed or modified by the majoritarian process. That is, the elected representatives of Congress, in consultation with the Executive branch, have the power to make any necessary changes. But this Court must not, by judicial fiat, impose the procedures intended for a federal civilian judiciary upon the military under the guise of the Constitution. To do so would be to ignore the constitutional deference given to Congress by our Founding Fathers because of the realities and practicalities of national security exigencies.

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which they are members. The assignment for duty of judge advocates of the Marine Corps shall be made by direction of the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The Judge Advocate General or senior members of his staff shall make frequent inspections in the field in supervision of the administration of military justice.

D. Special Deference

Based on the intent of the Framers, the Constitution, and Federal statute, the Supreme Court has given great deference to the authority of Congress and the President in military matters. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the power of Congress to provide for military justice. Judge Grace in *United States v. Prive,* 35 M.J. 569, 573-74 (CGCMR 1992), has listed some of those decisions as follows:

Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. 65, 79 (20 How.), 15 L. Ed. 838 (1858) ("These provisions show that Congress has the power to provide for the trial and punishment of military and naval offenses in the manner then and now practiced by civilized nations. . . .").

Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 123 (4 Wall.), 18 L. Ed. 281 (1866) ("Congress has declared the kinds of trial [for offenses by soldiers] and the manner in which they shall be conducted. . . .").

Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743, 94 S. Ct. 2547, 2555, 41 L. Ed. 2d 439 (1974) ("This Court has long recognized that the military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society. . . . The military has, again by necessity, developed laws and traditions of its own during its long history.")

Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 757, 95 S. Ct. 1300, 1313, 43 L. Ed. 2d 591, 609 (1975) ("The laws and traditions governing [military] discipline have a long history; . . . they are founded on unique military exigencies as powerful now as in the past. Their contemporary vitality repeatedly has been recognized by Congress.")

Northern Pipeline Construction Co v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 66, 102 S. Ct. 2858, 2869, 73 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1982) ("The exercise by Congress and the Ex-

ecutive of the power to establish and administer courts-martial . . . involves a constitutional grant of power that has been historically understood as giving the political Branches of Government extraordinary control over the precise subject matter at issue.")

In *United States v. Prive, supra* 35 M.J. at 576, Judge Grace summarized the effect of these decisions on the present issue by paraphrasing a statement from Northern Pipeline as follows:

> These precedents [of the Supreme Court] "represent no broad departure from the constitutional command that" *appointments must be made in accordance with the Appointments Clause.* Rather, they reduce to a narrow situation not subject to that command, that "recognizes a circumstance in which the grant of power to the Legislative and Executive Branches was historically and constitutionally so exceptional that the congressional assertion of power" *to designate military judges outside of the provisions of the Appointments Clause "was consistent with, rather than threatening to, the constitutional mandate of separation of powers."*

See 458 U.S. at 64, 102 S. Ct. at 2868 (emphasis added).

Judge Grace also relied on this statement from *Solorio v. United States,* 483 U.S. 435, 447, 107 S. Ct. 2924, 2931, 97 L. Ed. 2d 364 (1987):

> Decisions of this Court after *O'Callahan [v. Parker,* 395 U.S. 258, 89 S. Ct. 1683, 23 L. Ed. 2d 291 (1969)] have also emphasized that *Congress has primary responsibility for the delicate task of balancing the rights of servicemen against the needs of the military.* As we recently reiterated, " 'judicial

> deference . . . is at its apogee when legislative action under the congressional authority to raise and support armies and make rules and regulations for their governance is challenged.' "

(Emphasis added and citations omitted.)

I agree with the Coast Guard Court of Military Review and "conclude that Congress, in legislating for the land and naval forces, may provide for the designation of judges within the military justice system in a manner not provided for in the Appointments Clause of the Constitution." 35 M.J. at 577.

SULLIVAN, Chief Judge (dissenting):

I respectfully disagree with the lead opinion and Judge Crawford's separate opinion in this case. In my view the Constitution speaks clearly on the granted issue, and we are duty-bound to follow its supreme command. U.S. Const. art. VI. Military judges, both trial and appellate, are "inferior Officers" of the United States and must be appointed to their offices by "the President alone," or by this Court or one of the other "Courts of Law," or by the Secretary of Defense or one of the other "Heads of Departments." Art. II, § 2, para. 2, cl. 2. *See Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,* 111 S. Ct. 2631, 115 L. Ed. 2d 764 (1991). Appellant's military judges were not so appointed, but their status as *de facto* appointees might preclude reversal of his conviction. *See Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,* 458 U.S. 50, 88, 102 S. Ct. 2858, 2880, 73 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1982); *Buckley v. Valeo,* 424 U.S. 1, 142-43, 96 S. Ct. 612, 693, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1976). Nevertheless, I must dissent to the majority's simple affirmance of this case. *Id.*

More particularly, I do not believe that Congress' broad power to make rules for the land and naval forces under Article I, § 8, clause 14 of the Constitution is unlimited such that the Appointments Clause can be considered *per se* inapplicable to military justice legislation. *See generally Mistretta v. United States,* 488 U.S. 361, 382, 109 S. Ct. 647, 660, 102 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1989). (Even Congress' primary duty to make laws is limited by the constitutional prohibition against an ex post facto Law—*e.g.*, Art. I, § 9, para. 3). A contrary opinion in my view is extremely dangerous in that it upsets the delicate system of checks and balances provided in our Constitution to ensure the American way of government.

I would also hold that commissioning and promoting military officers by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate does not obviate the need for additional constitutional appointments of such persons for higher or more responsible officers both within and without the military department (*i.e.*, military trial judge or appellate judge). There is no blanket "commissioned officer" exception to the Appointments Clause written in the Constitution, and the decision of the Supreme Court in *Shoemaker v. United States,* 147 U.S. 282, 13 S. Ct. 361, 37 L. Ed. 170 (1893), should not be broadly extended to create one for military officers who are simply "legally trained." In sum, consistent with my judicial philosophy of spurning judicial legislation, I also must reject the judicial constitution-making accomplished by the lead opinion in this case.

I

The Granted Issue

The issue raised by appellate defense counsel and granted review by this Court is as follows:

> WHETHER APPELLANT'S COURT-MARTIAL LACKED JURISDICTION WHERE THE MILITARY JUDGE WAS DESIGNATED IN VIOLATION OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION, AND WHETHER THE NAVY-MARINE CORPS COURT OF MILITARY REVIEW WAS WITHOUT POWER TO REVIEW THIS CASE WHERE ITS JUDGES WERE DESIGNATED IN VIOLATION OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.

In this regard, I note that the judge in this trial was Major Edward F. Pesik, Jr., United States Marine Corps. He was certified in accordance with Article 26(b), Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC § 826(b); sworn in accordance with Article 42(a), UCMJ, 10 USC § 842(a); and detailed to this case.[1] The appellate military judges in this case were Senior Judge James A. Freyer, a Navy Captain; Senior Judge Richard A. Strickland, a Marine Colonel; and Judge James E. Orr, a Navy Captain. These judges constituted Panel No. 1 of the Court of Military Review, and they reviewed appellant's case in accordance with that court's internal rules.

The issue of law raised by appellate defense counsel and granted by this Court focuses on the "designation" of the military judge who tried his case and the "designation" of the military appellate judges who heard his appeal. Appellant does not contend that these designations were accomplished in violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Instead, he contends that they were not accomplished in accordance with the Appointments Clause of the United States Constitution. Art. II, § 2, para. 2, cl. 2. Relying heavily on the recent Supreme Court decision in *Freytag v. C.I.R., supra,* he asserts that military judges "are 'Officers of the United States' " who must be "appointed as such by the President, the Courts of Law, or the Head of a Department." Final Brief at 10. Finally, he asserts that the designation of these military judges by the Judge Advocate General of the Navy fails to satisfy this constitutional appointment standard.

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[1] Appellant represents without opposition that Major Pesik was a "General Court-Martial qualified" judge and the Sierra Judicial Circuit's Chief Military Judge.

II

The Statutes Establishing The Military Judge

A necessary step in resolving the granted issue is to understand the statutes which create the military trial and appellate judges and provide for persons to fill these judicial positions. At the outset I note that Congress has not expressly provided that a person be "appointed" a military trial judge or appellate judge. However, in the version of the Uniform Code of Military Justice enacted in 1950, Congress did provide for "appointment" of a law officer, the statutory predecessor of the military judge, by appropriate convening authorities. *See* Art. 26(a), UCMJ, 50 USC § 590(a), recodified in 10 USC § 826(a) (1956). Furthermore, in the 1950 Code, Congress provided for "appointment" of judges of this Court "by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate." Art. 67(a), UCMJ, 50 USC § 654(a), recodified in 10 USC § 867(a) (1956); *see* Art. 142(b)(1), UCMJ, 10 USC § 942(b)(1) (1989). Despite Congress' obvious familiarity with the appointment terminology, it chose to create the military judge and provide for filling this government position with somewhat less direct language.[2]

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[2] What is an "appointment" for purposes of the Appointments Clause is a substantial constitutional question concerning separation of powers which implicates all three branches of our Government. *See Marbury v. Madison,* 5 U.S. 137, 155 (1 Cranch), 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803). *See generally Buckley v. Valeo,* 424 U.S. 1, 122-24, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1976). Moreover, in *Auffmordt v. Hedden,* 137 U.S. 310, 327, 11 S. Ct. 103, 108, 34 L. Ed. 674 (1890), the Supreme Court clearly held that Congress' use of the word "select" rather than "appoint" was but one factor to be considered in determining whether the Appointments Clause applied. Finally, in *Shoemaker v. United States,* 147 U.S. 282, 13 S. Ct. 361, 37 L. Ed. 170 (1893), the Supreme Court impliedly held that designation of officers for additional duty requires compliance in some manner with the Appointments Clause.

I first note that, since 1969, Article 26(b) had provided that "[a] military judge shall be a commissioned officer of the armed forces." 10 USC § 531 further provides:

> § 531. Original appointments of commissioned officers
>
> (a) *Original appointments in the grades* of second lieutenant through colonel in the Regular Army, Regular Air Force, and Regular Marine Corps and in the grades of ensign through captain in the Regular Navy *shall be made by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.*

(Emphasis added.) See also 10 USC § 593 (appointment in reserves in commissioned grades below lieutenant colonel and commander by President alone).

The qualifications for original appointment are also statutorily established:

> § 532. Qualifications for original appointment as a commissioned officer
>
> (a) Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, an original appointment as a commissioned officer (other than as a commissioned warrant officer) in the Regular Army, Regular Navy, Regular Air Force, or Regular Marine Corps may be given only to a person who–
>
> (1) is a citizen of the United States;
>
> (2) is able to complete 20 years of active commissioned service before his fifty-fifth birthday;
>
> (3) is of good moral character;
>
> (4) is physically qualified for active service; and
>
> (5) as such other special qualifications as the Secretary of the military department concerned may prescribe by regulation.

Article 26(b) (1969) also provides that a military judge must be "a member of the bar of a Federal court or a member of the bar of the highest court of a State." This requirement for legal training is somewhat less stringent than the requirement for detail as trial counsel or defense counsel at a general court-martial. *See* Art. 27(b), UCMJ, 10 USC § 827(b), which states:

> (b) Trial counsel or defense counsel detailed for a general court-martial –
>
> (1) must be a *judge advocate who is a graduate of an accredited law school* or is a member of the bar of a Federal court or of the highest court of a State; or must be a member of the bar of a Federal court or of the highest court of a State; and
>
> (2) must be certified as competent to perform such duties by the Judge Advocate General of the armed force of which he is a member.

(Emphasis added.)

I next note that Article 26(b) (1969) provides that a military judge must be "certified to be qualified for duty as a military judge by the Judge Advocate General of the armed force of which such military judge is a member." The standards for certification are not provided by statute, and there is no statutory requirement that a military judge be designated a member of the Judge Advocate General's Corps or a Marine Corps judge advocate. However, as a practical matter, military judges to be certified as qualified normally would have experience as a trial or defense counsel under Article 27(b). This statute alternatively requires designation as a "judge advocate."

In fact, the military judge who presided over this court-martial was a Marine judge advocate. *See* NAVMC P-1005, Officers on Active Duty in the Marine Corps at 1-43 (1 Oct. 1989, 48 Rev.). 10 USC § 5587a provides:

§ 5587a. Regular Marine Corps: judge advocates

With the approval of the Secretary of the Navy, any regular officer on the active-duty list of the Marine Corps who is qualified under section 827(b) of this title *may, upon his application, be designated as a judge advocate.*

(Emphasis added.)

Moreover, two of the appellate military judges who heard his appeal before the Court of Military Review were members of the Navy Judge Advocate General's Corps. 10 USC § 5150 provides:

§ 5150. Staff corps of the Navy

(a) *The staff corps of the Navy are—*

(1) the Medical Corps;

(2) the Dental Corps;

(3) *the Judge Advocate General's Corps;*

(4) the Chaplain Corps; and

(5) such other staff corps as may be established by the Secretary of the Navy under subsection (b).

(b)(1) The Secretary of the Navy may establish staff corps of the Navy in addition to the Medical Corps, the Dental Corps, the Judge Advocate General's Corps, and the Chaplain Corps. *The Secretary may designate commissioned officers in, and may assign members to, any such staff corps.*

(Emphasis added.)

As indicated above, designation as a judge advocate does not determine where or when a commissioned officer serves this duty. Article 6, UCMJ, 10 USC § 806 (1984), further comments on the assignment for duty of judge advocates, as follows:

§ 806. Art. 6. Judge Advocates and legal officers

(a) The *assignment for duty of judge advocates* of the Army, *Navy,* Air Force, and Coast Guard *shall be*

> *made upon the recommendation of the Judge Advocate General of the armed force of which they are members. The assignment for duty of judge advocates of the Marine Corps shall be made by direction of the Commandant of the Marine Corps.* The Judge Advocate General or senior members of his staff shall make frequent inspections in the field in supervision of the administration of military justice.

(Emphasis added.) The legislative history makes clear that Congress intended the Judge Advocate General of each service to play a substantial initiating role in the assignment process while reserving to military personnel authorities the final say.[3] *See* Hearings on H.R. 2498

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[3] 10 USC § 5013(g) provides:

> (g) The Secretary of the Navy may—
>
> (1) assign, detail, and prescribe the duties of members of the Navy and Marine Corps and civilian personnel of the Department of the Navy;
>
> (2) change the title of any officer or activity of the Department of the Navy not prescribed by law; and
>
> (3) prescribe regulations to carry out his functions, powers, and duties under this title.

10 USC § 5131 creates the Bureau of Naval Personnel and 10 USC § 5132 empowers it as follows:

> § 5132. Bureaus: distribution of business; orders; records; expenses
>
> (a) Except as otherwise provided by law, the business of the executive part of the Department of the Navy shall be distributed among the bureaus as the Secretary of the Navy considers expedient and proper.
>
> (b) Each bureau shall perform its duties under the authority of the Secretary, and its orders are considered as coming from the Secretary.
>
> (c) Under the Secretary, each bureau has custody and charge of its records and accounts.
>
> (d) Each bureau shall furnish to the Secretary estimates for its specific, general, and contingent expenses.

For members of the Marine Corps, these powers are vested in the Commandant of the Marine Corps. *See* 10 USC § 5043(e)(3).

Before a Subcomm. of the House Armed Services Comm., 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 898-901 (1949), *reprinted in Index and Legislative History, Uniform Code of Military Justice* (1950).

Article 26(c) (1969) also provides that a "military judge of a general court-martial *shall be designated by the Judge Advocate General,* or his designee, of the armed force of which the military judge is a member *for detail* in accordance with regulations prescribed under subsection (a)." (Emphasis added.) The language of designation is not new (10 USC § 8067) and generally refers to "a special duty classification." *See* 1967 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2113, 2114. Again the actual assignment of a designated military judge to Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary is impliedly left to military personnel authorities. *See* SECNAVINST 5813.6C (13 April 1979).[4]

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[4] 6. Organization. The Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary is a naval activity as that term is defined in [U.S. Navy Regulations, 1973]. It is composed of the Office of the Chief Judge of the Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary and such Judicial Circuits and their Branch Offices as may be established by the Judge Advocate General. The Judge Advocate General may also establish Judicial Areas, each consisting of two or more Judicial Circuits, for the purpose of providing an intermediate level of supervision within the Trial Judiciary. Expansion of the Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary will come from current manpower resources as determined by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Judge Advocate General, acting in coordination. The Marine Corps Special Court-Martial Judiciary is disestablished, and its members are members of the Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary.

* * * * *

8. Authority Over Organization, Functions and Administration. The Judge Advocate General is authorized to organize, administer, assign, and reassign functions to the Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary and personnel attached thereto in accordance with [10 USC § 826 et seq.].

Finally, Article 26(a) (1969), in providing for detailing military judges to hear particular cases, states:

> (a) A military judge shall be detailed to each general court-martial. *Subject to regulations of the Secretary concerned,* a military judge may be detailed to any special court-martial. The Secretary concerned shall prescribe regulations providing for the manner in which military judges are detailed for such courts-martial and for the persons who are authorized to detail military judges for such courts-martial. The military judge shall preside over each open session of the court-martial to which he has been detailed.

(Emphasis added.) As noted in *United States v. Graf,* 35 M.J. 450 (CMA 1992), these regulations provide that detailing will be accomplished by the Chief Judge, the circuit military judge, or the circuit military judge's designee. *See* §§ 0120a(1) (1987); 0130a(1) (1990), Manual of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy.

In sum, the President and the Senate make a person a commissioned officer; the Secretary of the Navy makes that commissioned officer a judge advocate; the Judge Advocate General qualifies and classifies that judge advocate as a military judge; the Chief of Naval Personnel or the Commandant of the Marine Corps assigns him a duty station; and the Secretary of the Navy provides regulations for his detail to a particular case within that duty assignment.

III

Constitutional Tension

In view of these empowering statutes, it is now appropriate to turn to the United States Constitution. *See Dynes v. Hoover, 961 U.S. 65 (20 How.), 15 L. Ed. 838 (1858). Article I,* § 8 of the Constitution provides:

> The Congress shall have Power
>
> * * *
>
> To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two years;
>
> To provide and maintain a Navy;
>
> To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.

In addition, I note that this same section of the Constitution further provides:

> The Congress shall have Power
>
> * * *
>
> To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court;
>
> * * *
>
> To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.

Clearly, these constitutional grants of authority are sufficient to provide for the above-noted statutory establishment of a military justice system with military trial and appellate judges. *See Solorio v. United States,* 483 U.S. 435, 441, 107 S. Ct. 2924, 2928, 97 L. Ed. 2d 364 (1987); *Schlesinger v. Councilman,* 420 U.S. 738, 757-58, 95 S. Ct. 1300, 1313, 43 L. Ed. 2d 591 (1975). *See also Rostker v. Goldberg,* 453 U.S. 57, 65-66, 101 S. Ct. 2646, 2652, 69 L. Ed. 2d 478 (1981).

I also note the operative provisions of the Constitution which appellant asserts are applicable to the appointment of military judges. Article II states in pertinent part:

> Section 2. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States. . . .
>
> *[H]e shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint* Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and *all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may be Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.*

(Emphasis added.) Article II further states:

> Section 3. He shall . . . take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and *shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.*

(Emphasis added.)

In view of these provisions of the Constitution, three distinct but nonetheless related issues are raised which this Court must decide. First, can Congress create the position of military judge and provide for its filling under Article I, § 8 of thc Constitution without regard to the Appointment Clause of Article II, § 2 of the Constitution? (See Parts IV and V, below.) Assuming it cannot, what does Article II, § 2 of the Constitution require for a proper constitutional appointment to the office of military judge? (See Part VI below.) Finally, does the statutory system of designation/detail provided by Congress for military judges meet the above constitutional requirements? (See Part VII below.)

IV

The Scope of the Constitutional Power of Congress in Military Justice

It is beyond cavil that Congress has extremely broad powers to legislate in military matters generally and military justice matters in particular. Moreover, it is also quite clear that the Supreme Court has afforded great deference to Congress' decisions in this regard. The Coast Guard Court of Military Review has exhaustively summarized the relevant Supreme Court cases supporting these assertions in its decision in *United States v. Prive,* 35 M.J. 569, 573-75 (1992).

Despite these pronouncements, the Supreme Court has also made very clear that its deference to Congress in military matters is not absolute. *Rostker v. Goldberg,* supra, 453 U.S. at 67-68, 101 S. Ct. at 2653, states:

> None of this is to say that Congress is free to disregard the Constitution when it acts in the area of military affairs. In that area, as any other, Congress remains subject to the limitations of the Due Process Clause, *see Ex parte Milligan,* [71 U.S. 2], 4 Wall. 2 18 L. Ed. 281 (1866); *Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co.,* 251 U.S. 146, 156 [40 S. Ct. 106, 108, 64 L. Ed. 194] (1919), but the tests and limitations to be applied may differ because of the military context. We of course, do not abdicate our ultimate responsibility to decide the constitutional question, but simply recognize that the Constitution itself requires such deference to congressional choice. *See Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee,* 412 U.S. [94] at 103 [93 S. Ct. 2080, 2087, 36 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1973)]. In deciding the question before us we must be particularly careful not to substitute our judgment of

what is desirable for that of Congress, or our own evaluation of evidence for a reasonable evaluation by the Legislative Branch.

Moreover, in *Middendorf v. Henry,* 425 U.S. 25, 96 S. Ct. 1281, 47 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1976), the Supreme Court had earlier held that Congress' military justice powers were not totally independent of the rest of the Constitution. According to then-Justice Rehnquist:

> We recognize that plaintiffs, who have either been convicted or are due to appear before a summary court-martial, may be subjected to loss of liberty or property, and consequently are entitled to the due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.
>
> However, whether this process embodies a right to counsel depends upon an analysis of the interests of the individual and those of the regime to which he is subject. *Wolff v. McDonnell,* 418 U.S. 539, 556, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2976, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1974).
>
> In making such an analysis, we must give particular deference to the determination of Congress, made under its authority to regulate the land and naval forces, U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, that counsel should not be provided in summary courts-martial. As we held in *Burns v. Wilson,* 346 U.S. 137, 140, 73 S. Ct. 1045, 1047, 97 L. Ed. 1508 (1953):
>
> > "[T]he rights of men in the armed forces must perforce be conditioned to meet certain overriding demands of discipline and duty, and the civil courts are not the agencies which must determine the precise balance to be struck in this adjustment. The Framers especially entrusted that task to Congress." (Footnote omitted.)

425 U.S. at 43, 96 S. Ct. at 1291. *See also Solorio v. United States,* 483 U.S. at 451 n.18, 107 S. Ct. at 2933 n. 18.

A question remains, however, whether Congress' power to make rules for the government and regulation of the Army and Navy is also limited or restricted by Article II, § 2, paragraph 2, clause 2 of the Constitution. The Coast Guard Court of Military Review in *United States v. Prive, supra,* has held that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to include Congress' military justice power within the scope of the appointment clause. Relying on *Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,* 458 U.S. at 63-70, 102 S. Ct. at 2867-71, it asserts that the military justice system is one of those "narrow situations . . . in which the grant of power to the Legislative and Executive Branches was historically and constitutionally so exceptional that the congressional assertion of a power to create legislative courts was consistent with, rather than threatening to, the constitutional mandate of separation of powers." *Id.* at 64, 102 S. Ct. at 2868 (plurality opinion). *See* 35 M.J. at 575-76.

I disagree with the Coast Guard Court of Military Review for several reasons. First, the Supreme Court in *Northern Pipeline* held that the bankruptcy courts were not legislative courts properly excepted from compliance with the requirements of Article III of the Constitution. While it stated that courts-martial created by Congress under Article I, § 8 of the Constitution were legislative courts, and thus were not affected by Article III of the Constitution, it went no further. The additional leap taken by the Coast Guard Court of Military Review in extending this decision into the area of Article II and the Appointments Clause in disregard of the plain language of the Constitution is simply not justified. *See Mimmack v. United States,* 97 U.S. 426, 437, 24 L. Ed. 1067 (1878); *see also Wood v. United States,* 107 U.S. 414, 417, 2 S. Ct. 551, 554, 27 L. Ed. 542 (1883); *Blake v. United States,* 103 U.S. 227, 232, 26 L. Ed. 462 (1881); 30 Op. Atty Gen. 177,

180 (1913); 4 Op. Atty Gen. 603, 610 (1847). *See generally* 4 P. Kurland and R. Lerner, The Founders' Constitution 31-38, 98 (1987).

Second, the principle of separation of powers disputed in *Northern Pipeline* was between the congressional and judicial branches of our government. However, the Supreme Court in *Northern Pipeline* clearly recognized that the Constitution's exceptional plenary grant of power over the Nation's armed forces was to both the Legislative and Executive Branches of our Government. 458 U.S. at 71, 102 S. Ct. at 2871. Accordingly, the *ratio decidendi* employed by the Supreme Court in *Northern Pipeline* cannot be logically applied to a dispute between branches of the government which *both* historically and constitutionally share that very power. *See generally* E. Corwin, *The President: Office and Powers* (1787-1984) at 296 (5th rev. ed. 1984).

Finally, the Supreme Court in *Freytag v. C.I.R.*, 111 S. Ct. 2631, clearly recognized two concerns of the Framers of the Constitution in adopting the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. Justice Blackmun said:

> The roots of the separation-of-powers concept embedded in the Appointments Clause are structural and political. Our separation-of-powers jurisprudence generally focuses on the danger of one Branch's aggrandizing its power at the expense of another Branch. *See Mistretta v. United States,* 488 U.S. 361, 382, 109 S. Ct. 647, 659, 102 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1989). The Appointments Clause not only guards against this encroachment *but also preserves another aspect of the Constitution's structural integrity by preventing the diffusion of the appointment power.*

501 U.S. at __, 111 S. Ct. at 2638 (emphasis added).

More particularly, he later said:

> We cannot accept the Commissioner's assumption that every part of the Executive Branch is a department the head of which is eligible to receive the appointment power. *The Appointments Clause prevents Congress from distributing power too widely by limiting the actors in whom Congress may vest the power to appoint. The Clause reflects our Framers' conclusion that widely distributed appointment power subverts democratic government. Given the inexorable presence of the administrative state, a holding that every organ in the Executive Branch is a department would multiply indefinitely the numbers of actors eligible to appoint. The Framers recognized the dangers posed by an excessively diffuse appointment power and rejected efforts to expand that power. See Wood,* at 79-80. So do we. For the chief judge of the Tax Court to qualify as a "Head of a Department," the Commissioner must demonstrate not only that the Tax Court is a part of the Executive Branch but also that it is a department.

Id. at __, 111 S. Ct. at 2642 (emphasis added). This constitutional concern with Congress' excessive diffusion of the Executive's appointing power is simply not addressed by the *Northern Pipeline* rationale.

V

The Scope of the Constitutional Power of the Executive to Appoint Inferior Officers of the United States

The next inquiry concerns the actual scope of the Presidential appointment power. The general adage is that Congress creates the offices and the President appoints the necessary officers to fill them. *See generally* L. Tribe,

American Constitutional Law 244 (2d ed. 1988) However, the words of the Constitution more particularly narrow the positions in the Federal government which are included within the constitutional appointment process.

Article II of the Constitution states:

> Section 1. The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. . . .
>
> Section 2. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States. . . .
>
> He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and *he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint* Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, *and all other Officers of the United States,* whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment *of such inferior Officers,* as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
>
> The President shall have Power to fillup all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.
>
> Section 3. He shall . . . take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and *shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.*

(Emphasis added.)

In light of these provisions, the first question which arises is who are "all other Officers of the United States" or "such inferior Officers, as they think proper" within the meaning of Article II of the Constitution. The Supreme

Court in *United States v. Germaine,* 99 U.S. 508, 510, 25 L. Ed. 482 (1879), defined such officers as "all persons who can be said to *hold an office* under the government about to be established under the Constitution. . . ." (Emphasis added.) More recently, the Supreme Court spoke particularly on the office holders who could be considered "Officers of the United States," as follows:

> We think that the term "Officers of the United States" as used in Art. II, defined to include "all persons who can be said to hold an office under the government" in *United States v. Germaine, supra,* is a term intended to have substantive meaning. *We think its fair import is that any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an "Officer of the United States," and must, therefore, be appointed in the manner prescribed by* § 2, cl. 2, of that Article.

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 125-26, 96 S. Ct. at 685 (emphasis added). *See Freytag v. C.I.R.,* 111 S. Ct. at 2640. In this light, a critical question in this case is whether a military judge is an Officer of the United States.

I note that this Court most recently in *United States v. Graf,* 35 M.J. 450, 465 (CMA 1992), and *United States v. Mabe,* 33 M.J. 200 (CMA 1991), analyzed the statutes and regulations concerning the military judge and concluded that "the Uniform Code of Miltary Justice contemplates that a military judge be a real judge as commonly understood in the American legal tradition." 35 M.J. at 465. In addition, I note that in *Freytag v. C.I.R., supra,* the Supreme Court expressly held that a special trial judge established by Congress "as an aide to a Tax Court judge" is "an 'inferior Officer' whose appointment must confrorm to the Appointments Clause." 501 U.S. at __, 111 S. Ct. at 2640.

The Supreme Court in Freytag articulated its reasoning for reaching this conclusion, as follows:

> The Commission reasons that special trial judges may be deemed employees in subsection (b)(4) cases because they lack authority to enter a final decision. But this argument ignores the significance of the duties and discretion that special trial judges possess. The office of special trial judge is "established by Law," Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, and the duties, salary, and mens of appointment for the office are specified by statute. *See Burnap v. United States,* 252 U.S. 512, 516-517, 40 S. Ct. 374, 376-377, 64 L. Ed. 692 (1920); *United States v. Germaine,* 99 U.S. 508, 511-512, 25 L. Ed. 482 (1879). These characteristics distinguish special trial judges from special masters, who are hired by Article III courts on a temporary, episodic basis, whose positions are not established by law, and whose duties and functions are not delineated in a statute. *Furthermore, special trial judges perform more than ministerial tasks. They take testimony, conduct trials, rule on the admissibility of evidence, and have the power to enforce compliance with discovery orders. In the course of carrying out these important functions, the special trial judges exercise significant discretion.*
>
> *Even if the duties of special trial judges under subsection (b)(4) were not as significant as we and the two courts have found them to be, our conclusion would be unchanged. Under* §§ 7443A(b)(1), (2), and (3), and (c), the chief judge may assign special trial judges to render the decisions of the Tax Court in declaratory judgment proceedings and limited-amount tax cases. The Commissioner concedes that in cases governed by subsections (b)(1), (2), and (3),

special trial judges act as inferior officers who exercise independent authority.

501 U.S. at __, 111 S. Ct. at 2640 (emphasis added).

The position of military judge is established by law. *See* Arts. 26 and 66, UCMJ, 10 USC §§ 826 and 866, respectively. The duties and functions of a person in this position are also established by statute. *See* Arts. 26, 39, 51, and 66, UCMJ, 10 USC §§ 826, 839, 851, and 866, respectively. The Code authorizes military judges to hear and determine motions on various pretrial, trial, and posttrial matters (*see* Art. 39(a)); rule on all questions of law and interlocutory questions at courts-martial (Art. 51(b)); and impose Federal convictions up to and including life in prison, punitive separations from the service, and substantial financial penalties (Arts. 16(1)(B) and 18, UCMJ, 10 USC §§ 816(1)(B) and 818, respectively). A judge sitting with court members also instructs them on the various matters necessary to reach appropriate findings and sentences, even in capital cases where a servicemember's life is at stake. (Art. 51(c)). These are not ministerial tasks but judicial ones calling for the exercise of significant discretion. *See United States v. Graf,* 35 M.J. 450; *United States v. Cole,* 31 M.J. 270, 272 (CMA 1990). Finally, judges exercise independent authority. Art. 37, UCMJ, 10 USC § 837. *See United States v. Graf, supra.* In my view, the military trial judges and appellate military judges are "Officers of the United States," as provided for in Article II, § 2 of the Constitution.

VI

The Constitutional Requirements for a Valid Appointment

My next inquiry concerns the particular requirements provided in the Constitution for a valid appointment of "Officers of the United States." The answer to this ques-

tion in large part depends on whether a military judge is one of "all other Officers of the United States" or is one of the "inferior Officers" generally denominated in Article II, § 2. *See United States v. Germaine,* 99 U.S. 508, 509-10, 25 L. Ed. 482 (1879). *See generally* R. Rotunda, J. Nowak, and J. Young, *Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure* § 9.4 at 504-05 (1986). In light of the Supreme Court's characterization of a special tax court judge as an inferior officer in *Freytag v. C.I.R., supra,* I have no reservations in concluding that a military trial judge and military appellate judge are "inferior Officers" of the United States within the meaning of Article II, § 2. *See also Buckley v. Valeo,* 424 U.S. 1, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659.

In this light a military judge need not be appointed by the President by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate. However, it is required that he be appointed by "the President alone," a Court of Law, or a Head of a Department. *Freytag v. C.I.R., supra.* Nevertheless, the lead opinion and the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Military in *United States v. Coffman,* 35 M.J. 591 (1992), have held that this constitutional requirement is satisfied by a military officer's earlier commission and succeeding promotions by the President with the Advice and Consent of the Senate. Relying on *Shoemaker v. United States, supra,* they assert that no further appointment by the President, a Court of Law, or a Head of a Department is required to permit a "legally trained" military officer to constitutionally assume the office of military trial or appellate judge.[5]

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[5] This argument on its face fails to justify appointment of civilians to the Court of Military Review as authorized by Article 66, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC § 866.

The Navy-Marine Corps Court of Military Review articulated its rationale for its holding in *Coffman* as follows:

> Assuming *arguendo* that [the Appointments Clause] applies to military judges, the fact is that all military judges must be commissioned officers of the armed forces of the United States and, as such, have by law already been *appointed* by the President. Art. 26(b), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 826(b); 10 U.S.C. §§ 101(4), 101(15), 531, 593, 624, 5001(6), 5912. Depending upon grade, component, and presence on the active-duty list, some of these commissioned officers by law must also have had their appointments confirmed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. 10 U.S.C. §§ 531, 593, 624, 5912. All military judges must be lawyers. Art. 26(b), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 826(b). The duties these commissioned officers are detailed to perform as military judges are within the sphere of their official duties and are germane to the office they already hold. A second appointment from the President to a commissioned officer to perform the duties of a military judge is simply not required. *Cf. Shoemaker v. United States,* 147 U.S. 282, 299-301, 13 S. Ct. 361, 390-391, 37 L. Ed. 170, 185 (1892) (Army officers (engineers) were not required to obtain a second appointment to perform duties on a commission created by Congress to acquire lands for a park). Accordingly, we conclude the appellant's first assignment of error is also without merit.

35 M.J. at 592.

The lead opinion more particularly posits two reasons why no further constitutional appointment of military judges is required by the Appointments Clause. First, it concludes that the office of military judge is not a "new of-

fice," so no additional appointment is required under *Shoemaker v. United States, supra.* Assuming it is a new office, the opinion holds that the germaneness of its duties to those duties previously performed by "legally trained military officers" also precludes the need for a second appointment under *Shoemaker.* I disagree.

The lead opinion concedes that a military judge is an Officer of the United States. Moreover, it notes that the new powers of this officer were previously shared by the members of a court-martial, its president, and its law officer. Thus, Congress did not increase the power and duties of "an existing office" but created a new office to which these powers were transferred. It is the removal of these powers and duties from commissioned military officers, not their addition thereto, which renders inapposite the lead opinion's no-"new-office" argument.

I also find that the lead opinion grossly misapprehends the nature of the duties of a military judge and his contribution to military justice. The creation of the military judge in 1969 was a watershed event because it introduced for the first time statutorily, a *professional judiciary* at courts-martial.[6] S.Rep. No. 1601, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3,

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[6] The establishment of the military judge was not the only change accomplished by the legislation of 1968. Also, for the first time in the history of American military justice, a service-member could be tried and sentenced by a single military officer without court members in serious non-capital cases. Art. 16(1)(B), UCMJ, 10 USC § 816(1)(B). *See* H. Moyer, *Justice and The Military* § 2-620 at 536 (1972); Douglass, *The Judicialization of Military Courts,* 22 Hastings L.J. 213, 220 (1971).

Representative Philbin commented on the reason for this bill as follows:

> The need for this bill has become acute because of the increased size of our Armed Forces resulting from the military activity in Southeast Asia. Besides the savings in time and manpower af-

14 (1968). *See* Ervin, *The Military Justice Act of 1968,* 45 Mil.L.Rev. 77, 83, 88-91 (1969). *See generally* Ross, *The*

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forded by the bill, the bill provides meaningful benefits and protections to the accused.

The enactment of this legislation will permit the procedure for trials by special and general courts-martial to conform more closely with the procedure used in the trial of criminal cases in the U.S. district courts and will enhance the prestige and effectiveness of the law officer, whose name is changed by the bill to "military judge," so that his judicial stature and authority in the courtroom will more closely approximate that of a civilian trial judge. The bill allows the military judge to rule finally on certain procedural matters, such as motions for findings of not guilty, on which he now may be overruled by the court members who are untrained in the law. The bill provides for pretrial and posttrial sessions to be held by the military judge without the presence of the court panel for the purpose of deciding procedural questions. The bill provides for trial in special and general court-martial by a military judge alone without court members if the accused requests and the request is approved by the military judge. *These last two provisions are expected to save innumerable man-hours of line officers who would otherwise be required to be in attendance at courts-martial, as well as improving the internal efficiency of the justice system.*

* * *

The enactment of this bill will be the most significant advance in the field of military justice since the enactment of the Uniform Code of Military Justice in 1951.

114 Cong. Rec. 30563-64 (1968) (emphasis added).

Representative Bennett, a central figure in the development of this legislation, made this statement regarding the 1968 legislation:

> The need for this bill has become acute because of the increased size of our Armed Forces resulting from our present military activity in Vietnam. The bill provides meaningful benefits and protections to the accused, as well as streamlining procedures. The bill contains the following provisions, which are designed to increase the fairness of the military justice system: First, the accused must be afforded the right to be defended by a qualified lawyer at

Military Justice Act of 1968: Historical Background, 23 JAG J. 125 (1969). In this context, a holding that this office is new is an understatement.

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special courts-martial -- heretofore such a right only existed in the case of general courts-martial; second, before a bad conduct discharge can be adjudged at a special court-martial, the accused must be represented by a qualified lawyer and the proceedings must be conducted by a "military judge" -- a term I will discuss below -- except where physical conditions or military exigencies prevent one from being obtained; third, the bill extends the time in which the accused can petition for a new trial from 1 to 2 years; and fourth, an accused faced with trial at summary court-martial can object to such an informal trial, at which time the convening authority must bring charges at a special or general court-martial or dismiss them.

The enactment of H.R. 15971 will permit the procedure for trials in the military to conform more closely to the procedures used in the Federal courts. The bill also enhances the prestige and effectiveness of the law officer, whose name is changed to "military judge." The role of the "military judge" will closely approximate that of a civilian trial judge: he will rule finally on certain procedural matters and will hold open pretrial and posttrial sessions without the presence of the court for the purpose of deciding procedural questions. An accused can request a special and general court-martial by a "military judge" alone.

The bill changes the name of the intermediate appellate agencies in the military from boards of review to courts of military review. The bill requires that the judges of these courts and of courts-martial be part of an independent judiciary. In addition, the bill authorizes a military form of release on bail pending appeal, the need for which has been pointed out in several recent cases.

The importance of this legislation cannot be overstated. It is particularly needed in Vietnam, as has been pointed out by General Westmoreland; for under the bill line officers will be free from the necessity of serving as court members in many cases; and many previously wasted man-hours will be saved because of streamlined procedures.

I think it is most significant that the House of Representatives, which fathered the Uniform Code of Military Justice, also ini-

Turning to the lead opinion's "germane duties" rationale, I also find its application in the present case unacceptable. *Shoemaker v. United States, supra,* is an exception to normal Appointments Clause practice, and a very narrow one at that. The lead opinion's extension of that case beyond its facts to permit the blanket investing of "legally trained" military officers with the office of military judge without compliance with the Appointments Clause is simply unprecedented. Strictly speaking, such an approach might be appropriate only if the "legally trained" military officers also held a specific presidentially appointed military justice office such as the Judge Advocate General of the Navy. *See* 10 USC § 5148.[7] Otherwise, the

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tiated the action on this legislation and now has the opportunity to put the capstone on it. *The enactment of H.R. 15971 will be the most significant advance in the field of military justice since enactment of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. I heartily recommend the House approve the Senate amendments.*

114 Cong. Rec. 30565 (1968) (emphasis added).

[7] Neither of the two cases cited in *Shoemaker v. United States,* 147 U.S. 282, 301, 13 S. Ct. 361, 391, 37 L. Ed. 170 (1893), supports a "commissioned officer" exception to the Appointments Clause or its general-military-duty rationale as created by the lead opinion.

The petitioner in *Smith v. Whitney,* 116 U.S. 167, 6 S. Ct. 570, 29 L. Ed. 601 (1886), was an officer of the Navy who was later *appointed by the President by and with the consent of the Senate,* as the "chief of the bureau of provisions and clothing and pay-master general in the department of the navy, with the relative rank of commodore." Id. at 168, 6 S. Ct. at 570.

The petitioner in *Wales v. Whitney,* 114 U.S. 564, 5 S. Ct. 1050, 29 L. Ed. 277 (1885), was an officer in the Navy who *was later appointed by the President, by and with the consent of the Senate* as "chief of the bureau of medicine and surgery in the department of the navy," which office carried the additional title of "surgeon general of the navy." *Id.* at 569, 5 S. Ct. at 1052. *See* 10 USC § 5137, Historical and Revision Notes, R.S. 421 and 426.

The Supreme Court's holding that these military officers could be

lead opinion's general-duties analysis, at least in my view, constitutes judicial activism.

In *Shoemaker,* the Supreme Court considered the devolution of additional duties not on commissioned military officers in general or on commissioned military engineering officers. Instead, they devolved on military officers already holding a specific military or civilian office requiring a presidential appointment. *See* Thian, *Legislative History of General Staff of the Army of the United States* 3, 485 (1901). *See generally Hoeppel v. United States,* 66 App. D.C. 71, 85 F.2d 237, 241 (D.C. Cir. 1936). One Rock Park Creek Commission member who was a military officer had been previously appointed by the President to the Office of the Chief of Engineers of the United States Army. *See* R.S. §§ 1094, 1151, and 1193 (1878), and 17 Op. Atty Gen. 2, 3 (1881); *see generally* 1 Stat. 749 (1799) and 20 Stat. 151, § 13 (1878); *see also* 10 USC § 3036 (1956). The second, also a military officer, had previously been "detailed" by the President as the Engineer Commissioner for the District of Columbia. *See* Ch. 180 § 2, 20 Stat. 103 (1878); 26 Stat. 1113 (1890); *see also* 10 USC § 3534 (1956). Thus, the additional "germane" duty of membership on the Rock Creek Park Commission cannot be simply said to have generally devolved on a diffused pool of commissioned officers or commissioned officers with engineering training.

Second, the *Shoemaker* decision makes clear that this extraordinary application of the Appointments Clause rests on a conclusion that the new additional duties are "germane to the offices already held by them." 147 U.S.

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court-martialed for offenses under the Articles for the Government of the Navy does not logically suggest that an additional presidential appointment was not required for their assumption of their more particular civil or military offices.

at 301, 13 S. Ct. at 391. More particularly, the Supreme Court there said:

> It is true that it may be sometimes difficult to say whether a given duty, devolved by statute *upon a named officer,* has regard to the civil or military service of the United States. *Wales v. Whitney,* 114 U.S. 564, 569, 5 S. Ct. 1050, 29 L. Ed. 277 [1052]; *Smith v. Whitney,* 116 U.S. 167, 179, 181, 6 S. Ct. 570, 29 L. Ed. 601 [576, 577]. But, in the present case, the duty which the military officers in question were called upon to perform cannot fairly be said to have been dissimilar to, or outside of the sphere of, their official duties.

147 U.S. at 301, 13 S. Ct. at 391 (emphasis added). The additional duties as a member of the Rock Creek Park Commission were particularly related to the military officers' office as Chief of Engineers of the United States Army and office as Engineer Commissioner for the District of Columbia. Clearly neither duty as engineer nor training as an engineer sufficed.

Appellate government counsel and various amici have also asserted that the duties of a military judge are "germane" to the various powers of a commissioned officer under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. These include the power to "quell quarrels, frays, and disorders" (Art. 7(c), UCMJ, 10 USC § 807(c)); make arrests (Art. 9(b), UCMJ, 10 USC § 809(b)); serve as an investigating officer (Art. 32, UCMJ, 10 USC § 832); impose non-judicial punishments (Art. 15, UCMJ, 10 USC § 815); and serve as court-martial members at special courts-martial without a military judge (Art. 25(a), UCMJ, 10 USC § 825(a)). I do not consider a military judge's judicial duties similar to or within the sphere of the general military justice responsibilities of a line officer. Moreover, the latter duties are collateral and irregular and, therefore, also lack the specificity-of-office considered in *Shoemaker.*

Finally, the available lower court decisions applying Shoemaker simply do not support a broad military commission-promotion exception to the Appointments Clause for legally trained officers. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit applied *Shoemaker* in the context of the "Investigating Committee of the Judicial Council of Eleventh Circuit." *See In the Matter of Certain Complaints Under Investigation*, 783 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir.1986). It noted that the members of this committee were sitting federal judges already appointed by the President who were later selected for service on this judicial committee by the Chief Judge of the Circuit. It held:

> Their selection for services on the Committee does not gain them new positions in any meaningful sense; *to the contrary, service on a committee of the judicial council, when called upon, is merely an outgrowth of their existing responsibilities. See Shoemaker v. United States*, 147 U.S. 282, 301, 13 S. Ct. 361, 391, 37 L. Ed. 170 (1893) (*a statutory expansion of the functions of an existing position does not create a new office requiring re-appointment, at least where the newly-added duties are "germane" to existing functions*). *See also* 28 U.S.C. §§ 291, 292 (the Chief Justice may designate and temporarily assign any circuit judge to act as a circuit judge in another circuit if necessary; chief judges of circuit courts may make similar designations and temporary assignments with respect to district judges and districts within their circuits); *id.* §§ 293-96.

783 F.2d at 1515 (emphasis added). A previously appointed judge is not the same as a previously commissioned officer who is simply "legally trained."

Judge Lamberth of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia also impliedly rejected the "legal-

ly trained" military-officer interpretation of *Shoemaker*. He said:

> The [Supreme] Court rejected this argument [that a commission member could not serve absent Senate approval], holding that:
>
> > As, however, the two persons whose eligibility is questioned were at the time of the passage of the act and of their action under it officers of the United States who had been theretofore appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, we do not think that, because additional duties, germane to the offices already held by them, were devolved upon them by the act, it was necessary that they should be again appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. It cannot be doubted, and it has frequently been the case, that *Congress may increase the power and duties of an existing office without thereby rendering it necessary that the incumbent should be again nominated and appointed.*
>
> *Id.* at 301, 13 S. Ct. at 391 (emphasis added).
>
> The *Shoemaker* case is distinguishable from this case in two important respects. *First, the provision challenged in Shoemaker added certain duties to two offices; it did not confer additional responsibilities on any particular officer. Had the Chief of Engineers of the United States Army or the Engineer Commissioner of the District of Columbia resigned from office after the commission was established, he would no longer have served on the commission*—the new Chief of Engineers or Engineer Commissioner would have taken over those duties. Here, however, Mr. Wall was designated the new Director of OTS. Although the position was given to him by virtue of his prior position, it was given to him.

Olympic Federal S & L Assn. v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 732 F. Supp. 1183, 1192-93 (D.D.C. 1990) (some emphasis added). Again, no mention whatsoever was made concerning their remaining status as military officers or their general training as engineers.

Lastly, *Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. United States*, 8 Cl. Ct. 700 (1985), provides an example of Congress' recognition and treatment of the *Shoemaker* problem. That decision notes that Congress, in constituting the United States Claims Court in 1982 by using trial judges from the old Court of Claims, expressly confronted a *Shoemaker* problem. Judge Merow provided the following footnote in his opinion:

> Thus, in discussing the constitutionality of the provision of Pub.L. No. 97-164 reconstituting the trial division of the Court of Claims into a United States Claims Court comprised of the trial judges of the Court of Claims, H.R.Rep. No. 96-1300, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, n.25, states as follows:
> "Article III, section 1, of the Constitution explicitly empowers the Congress to ordain and establish inferior courts. Consequently, the only questions concern the relation between the power of Congress, under Article 1, section 8, cl. 18, of the Constitution to alter, enlarge, or restrict the functions of existing federal officers and the requirement of the Appointments Clause, Article II, section 2, cl. 2, that appointments as officers of the United States be made in the manner prescribed by that clause. Stated differently, this involves a reconciliation of the Supreme Court's decisions in *Shoemaker v. United States*, 147 U.S. 282, 301, 13 S. Ct. 361, 391, 37 L. Ed. 170 (1893), and *Buckley v. Valeo*, 424 U.S. 1, 118-36, 96 S. Ct. 612, 681-90, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1976). The earlier case

> stated the principle that Congress may, by statute, confer new duties on officers of the United States, at least where the new duties are 'germane' to their existing functions, without the necessity of reappointment under the Appointments Clause. The latter holds that Congress may not itself appoint officers of the United States.
>
> "The Committee has concluded that the carry-over of the trial judges into the Claims Court is a modification of an existing position rather than a legislative appointment to a new one, governed by *Buckley*. The bill merely would confer 'germane' new duties and extend the tenure of the existing trial judges as permitted by *Shoemaker*, rather than create a new office."

8 Cl. Ct. at 702. Examination of the legislative history of Article 26 especially since 1968 reveals no similar statements by Congress concerning *Shoemaker*'s applicability to "legally trained" or untrained commissioned officers and the newly created position of military judge.

VII

Application to the Present Case

Finding the *Shoemaker* decision inapplicable, my final concern is whether the system of appointment of a military judge provided in the Uniform Code of Military Justice nonetheless meets the standards of Article II, § 2 of the Constitution. I have noted earlier that military judges are not technically "appointed" under the Code, and their being invested with office is a more complicated process than represented in the granted issue. In addition, I note that Major Pesik, the military judge who presided at appellant's court-martial, was a Marine, and the appellate court panel for this case was composed of both Navy and Marine officers.

Turning first to Major Pesik, he was commissioned an officer in the United States Marine Corps by appointment of the President, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate. 10 USC § 531(a); *see* 10 USC § 532 or § 593. In accordance with the normal course of events, he rose to the grade of major in the Marine Corps, some of his promotions requiring appointment by the President alone and some also requiring the Advice and Consent of the Senate. 10 USC § 624(c). At some point, with the approval of the Secretary of the Navy, he was designated "a judge advocate." 10 USC § 5587a. His assignment for duty as a judge advocate of the Marine Corps was made by direction of the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Art. 6(a). Moreover, he was certified by the Judge Advocate General of the Navy to perform the duties of trial and defense counsel detailed for a general court-martial. Art. 27(b). Later, he was certified as qualified to be a military judge and designated for detail as such by the Judge Advocate General of the Navy. Art. 26(b). Finally, he was assigned to duty at the Sierra Judicial Circuit by the Commandant of the Marine Corps on the recommendation of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy.

The Marine Colonel and Navy Captains on the Court of Military Review were also commissioned officers who were appointed by the President with the Advice and Consent of the Senate. Their promotions to these distinguished grades were accomplished by appointment of the President with the Advice and Consent of the Senate. They were constituted a court by the Judge Advocate General of the Navy and designated for detail to it by that same officer.

The bottom line is that none of these military judges was appointed to that position or a germane position by the President alone, the Courts of Law, or the Head of a Department[8].

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[8] The term "Heads of Departments" for purposes of the Appointments Clause has recently been defined by the Supreme Court to be a

VIII

CONCLUSION

Duty To Inform

In summary, it is my view that a military judge is not only a military officer but an "inferior Officer" of the United States as provided for in Article II, § 2 of the Constitution. Congress under Article I, § 8 of the Constitution was fully competent to create such a military judicial position and empower the holder of this office to dispense justice to servicemembers at courts-martial. Having done so, however, it was further required by Article II, § 2 to provide that the person who fills this office be appointed by the President, a Court of Law, or the Head of a Department.

The reason that Congress has not provided for this type of appointment for military judges is not readily apparent. The lead opinion suggests that Congress, cognizant of the decision in *Shoemaker v. United States*, 147 U.S. 282, 13 S. Ct. 361, 37 L. Ed. 170 made a conscious decision that a second appointment by the President of a commissioned officer to perform these new court-martial duties was not necessary. Examination of the legislative history of the statutes creating this position, however, offers no express support for this theory. *Cf. Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community V. United States*, 8 Cl. Ct. at 702 n. 1. Moreover, examination of the *Shoemaker* decision in light

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member of the Cabinet. *See Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue*, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 2642-43, 115 L. Ed. 2d 764 (1991). "Courts of Law" are also defined in terms of their "exclusively judicial role." *Id.* at __, 111 S. Ct. at 2645. Neither the Secretary of the Navy, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, nor the Judge Advocate General of the Navy meets either of these tests.

of the legislation creating the military judge suggests to me that this decision's rationale is inapplicable to the case at bar. *See Olympic Fed. S & L v. Office of Thrift Supervision*, 732 F. Supp. at 1192-93.

My own view is more consistent with congressional silence. The office of military judge was established in 1968 when the Supreme Court utilized a "mode of appointment" approach to the Appointments Clause. *See* Note, *Toward a New Functional Methodology in Appointments Clause Analysis*, 60 G.W.L.Rev. 536, 539-43 (1991); *cf.* Note, *Power of Appointment to Public Office Under The Federal Constitution*, 42 Harv.L.Rev. 426 (1929). In other words, an "inferior Officer" of the United States was a Federal office holder whose appointment Congress required be made by the President, a Court of Law, or the Head of a Department. *United States v. Mouat*, 124 U.S. 303, 8 S. Ct. 505, 31 L. Ed. 463 (1888). *See Hoeppel v. United States*, 66 App. D.C. 71, 85 F.2d 237, 241 (D.C.Cir.1936). It was not until 1976 in *Buckley v. Valeo*, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659, that the "mode of appointment" approach was jettisoned in favor of a functional duty approach to Appointments Clause questions. *See* Note, 42 Harv.L.Rev. at 544-52; *see also Freytag v. C.I.R.*, 115 L. Ed. 2d 764, 111 S. Ct. 2631. In my view, there is simply no doubt that a military judge's duties and responsibilities now qualify him as an "inferior Officer" of the United States.[9]

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[9] The Supreme Court has recently denied petitions for certiorari in two cases where this Appointments Clause issue was raised for the first time in that Court. *Bolado v. United States*, 113 S. Ct. 321, 121 L. Ed. 2d 242 (1992); *Allen v. United States*, 113 S. Ct. 324, 121 L. Ed. 244 (1992). However, as the Supreme Court itself has consistently said, "The denial of a writ of certiorari imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of the case, as the bar has been told many times." *United States v. Carver*, 260 U.S. 482, 490, 43 S. Ct. 181, 182, 67 L.

The Remedy

Appellant has shown no specific prejudice to his case due to the failure to provide for compliance with the Appointments Clause. However, simple affirmance is not sufficient under the *de facto*-appointee rationale of *Buckley* and the *Northern Pipeline* cases. It is the duty of this Court also to point out the unconstitutional statutory deficiency as this opinion has done. It should be in Congress' hands to render appropriate legislation to fix this statutory deficiency. In the interim, the President could, based on the rationale in this opinion, direct the Head of the Department of Defense to start appointing military judges as necessary to perform military justice functions in the department. *See United States v. Matthews*, 16 M.J. 354, 382 (CMA 1983). Thus, the Executive Branch's constitutional role in this area, as envisioned by the Appointments Clause, would be restored.

WISS, Judge (dissenting):

Not since *Solorio v. United States*, 483 U.S. 435, 107 S. Ct. 2924, 97 L. Ed. 2d 364 (1987),[1] has an appeal

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Ed. 361 (1923). *See generally* R. Stern, E. Gressman, and S. Shapiro, *Supreme Court Practice* 269-72 (6th ed. 1986).

[1] That is the only case in which the Supreme Court of the United States has granted plenary review of a decision of this Court, *see* Art. 67a, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC § 867a (1989); *see also* Art. 67(h)(1), UCMJ, 10 USC § 867(h)(1) (1983). There, the Court held that jurisdiction of a court-martial depended solely on the accused's status as a member of the armed forces, not on the "service connection" of the offenses charged. In doing so, the Court expressly overruled its decision in *O'Callahan v. Parker*, 395 U.S. 258, 89 S. Ct. 1683, 23 L. Ed. 2d 291 (1969), that had rested significantly on the historical viewpoint that "both in England prior to the American Revolution and in our own national history military trial of soldiers committing civilian offenses has been viewed with suspicion." *O'Callahan v. Parker, supra* at 268, 89 S. Ct. at 1688 (footnote omitted), quoted in *Solorio v. United States*, 483 U.S. 435, 442, 107 S. Ct. 2924, 2928, 97 L. Ed. 2d 364 (1987).

presented questions of such fundamental importance to the institutional integrity and viability of the military justice system as does this one. Once the legal chaff is separated out, the grain of the related questions of law before this Court is quite clear:

First, in exercising its power "to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces" under Article I, § 8, clause 14 of the Constitution, is Congress exempt from the prescriptions of Article II, § 2, clause 2 of the Constitution – the Appointments Clause – regarding appointment of "Officers of the United States"?

Second, within the meaning of the Appointments Clause and the decision in *Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue*, 111 S. Ct. 2631, 115 L. Ed. 2d 764 (1991), do Articles 26 and 66 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC §§ 26 and 66, respectively, establish a distinct office of military judge?

Third, if so, does the decision in *Shoemaker v. United States*, 147 U.S. 282, 13 S. Ct. 361, 37 L. Ed. 170 (1893), permit the conclusion that the duties of that distinct office are "germane" to the duties either of military officers generally or "legally trained military officers" specifically, so that the Appointments Clause does not require separate appointment of some such military officers as military judges?

Today, a majority of this Court approves the present practice of appointment of military judges by officials[2] below the rank of those set out in Article II, § 2, clause 2 of the Constitution – the Appointments Clause. In doing

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[2] One important dimension to the problem underlying this appeal is that it is not entirely clear *who* "appoints" military judges. As the separate opinion of Chief Judge Sullivan makes apparent, the answer is not the obvious first guess (the Judge Advocate General of each service) and is not consistent among the armed forces.

so, however, I believe that the various opinions of my colleagues who join in that disposition improperly reconcile the two provisions of the Constitution that are in issue in the first question and incorrectly read the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States on which answers to the second and third questions depend. Accordingly, I dissent.

I

Without question, the Constitution vested in Congress the powers to "raise and support Armies" (cl. 12); "provide and maintain a Navy" (cl. 13); and "make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces" (cl. 14). Art. I, § 8. The critical question at the outset here is not Congress' authority to legislate in this area by constructing a military justice system and providing for trial and appellate military judges; rather, it is whether, in doing so, Congress is free from the facially unconditioned restriction of the Appointments Clause regarding how those military judges must be appointed.

The Chief Judge, particularly in Part IV of his opinion, thoughtfully treats the matter of deference to Congress in its regulation of military affairs. *See United States v. Prive*, 35 M.J. 569, 573-77 (CGCMR 1992). The Supreme Court has instructed that "judicial deference . . . is at its apogee when legislative action under the congressional authority to raise and support armies and make rules and regulations for their governance is challenged." *Rostker v. Goldberg*, 453 U.S. 57, 70, 101 S. Ct. 2646, 2655, 69 L. Ed. 2d 478 (1981), quoted in *Solorio v. United States, supra*, 483 U.S. at 447, 107 S. Ct. at 2931. *See also Goldman v. Weinberger*, 475 U.S. 503, 508, 106 S. Ct. 1310, 1313, 89 L. Ed. 2d 478 (1986).

Deference, however, does not equate to abdication. The Supreme Court has recognized that, in light on Congress' regulatory powers over the military, constitutional rights might have application and meaning in the military different from the civilian community, *see, e.g., Solorio v. United States, supra* 483 U.S. at 447, 107 S. Ct. at 2931. The Court, however, has never instructed that Congress' regulatory power is a talisman, in the face of which the remainder of the Constitution withers. Indeed, quite to the contrary, the Court stated in *Rostker v. Goldberg, supra*, 453 U.S. at 67, 101 S. Ct. at 2653:

> None of this is to say that Congress is free to disregard the Constitution when it acts in the area of military affairs. In that area, as any other, Congress remains subject to the limitations of the Due Process Clause, but the tests and limitations to be applied may differ because of the military context. We of course do not abdicate our ultimate responsibility to decide the constitutional question, but simply recognize that the Constitution itself requires such deference to congressional choice.

(Citations omitted.)

The Constitution's grant of regulatory power to Congress over military affairs is no more plenary than, for instance, its grant of power to Congress in Article I "to . . . provide for the . . . general Welfare of the United States" (§ 8, cl.1); or over Federal elections (§ 4); or "to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" these and other powers specifically set out elsewhere in the Constitution (§ 8, cl. 18). When the Supreme Court in *Buckley v. Valeo*, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1976), was presented with the argument that appointment of members of the Federal Election Commission was pursuant to these plenary powers of

Congress and, thus, not subject to the Appointments Clause, the Court responded:

> But Congress has plenary authority in all areas in which it has substantive legislative jurisdiction, *McCulloch v. Maryland*, 17 U.S. 316 (4 Wheat.) 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819), so long as the exercise of that authority does not offend some other constitutional restriction. We see no reason to believe that the authority of Congress over federal election practices is of such a wholly different nature from the other grants of authority to Congress that it may be employed in such a manner as to offend well-established constitutional restrictions stemming from the separation of powers.
>
> The position that because Congress has been given explicit and plenary authority to regulate a field of activity, it must therefore have the power to appoint those who are to administer the regulatory statute is both novel and contrary to the language of the Appointments Clause. Unless their selection is elsewhere provided for, *all* officers of the United States are to be appointed in accordance with the Clause . . . . No class or type of officer is excluded because of its special functions.

424 U.S. at 132, 96 S. Ct. at 688.

I agree. There is nothing anywhere in the Constitution of the United States or in decisions of the Supreme Court that supports the notion that mandates of the Constitution do not penetrate the walls of the military enclave. Further, unlike application of certain individual rights to servicemembers, there is nothing about the Appointments Clause that requires a different application in a military context than it does in the rest of the United States.[3]. Nothing

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[3] Judge Crawford's attempt to distinguish between civilian and military judiciaries based on "military exigencies" is a strawman. No-

could be plainer than that the Appointments Clause, by its own terms, does not except appointment to offices created under Congress' power to regulate the military any more than it excepts appointment to offices created under any of Congress' other numerous, plenary powers.

In short, as the Supreme Court succinctly stated in *Freytag v. C.I.R.*, 111 S. Ct. at 2639, "Neither Congress nor the Executive can agree to waive this structural protection" of the Appointments Clause.[4] Accordingly, if the Uniform Code of Military Justice established a distinct office of military judge, appointments to fill that office must comport with the Appointments Clause.

II

In an effort to identify who are included as "Officers of the United States" and other "inferior Officers" within the

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thing in any of the other opinions in this case would have any untoward impact whatsoever on the ability of the Judge Advocate General to *tactically move and reassign* military judges or to meet the operational realities of a military in the field, as well as in the garrison. At the same time, there was no occasion of which this Court has been made aware that required any sort of *emergency appointment* of military judges resulting from deployment of our armed forces. Simply stated, Judge Crawford's implied alarm—that appointment of military judges by, say, the Secretary of Defense (*see* opinion, *infra*) somehow undermines the response capability of our armed forces in some manner that appointment by the Judge Advocate General does not—is a *false* alarm.

[4] Judge Crawford's constricted focus on the purpose of the Appointments Clause is a misstep off the cleared path of the law. As the Supreme Court of the United States unequivocally instructed in *Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue*, 111 S. Ct. 2631, 2639, 115 L. Ed. 2d 764 (1991), the Appointments Clause not only involves the constitutional tug-of-war between the Executive and Legislative Branches but also ensures that responsibility to make appointments to offices in the Executive Branch will not be delegated and diffused to a level below the very highest, responsive level of "the President alone," "Courts of Law," or "Heads of Departments."

meaning of the Appointments Clause, the Supreme Court has said:

> We think that the term "Officers of the United States" as used in Art. II, defined to include "all persons who can be said to hold an office under the government" in *United States v. Germaine* [, 99 U.S. 508, 510, 25 L. Ed. 482 (1879)], is a term intended to have substantive meaning. We think its fair import is that *any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States* is an "Officer of the United States," and must, therefore, be appointed in the manner prescribed by § 2, cl. 2, of that Article.

Buckley v. Valeo, supra, 424 U.S. at 126, 96 S. Ct. at 685 (emphasis added), cited with approval in *Freytag v. C.I.R.*, supra, 111 S. Ct. at 2640.[5]

Military judges are "established by Law," and their "duties and functions are . . . delineated in a statute"—specifically, Articles 26 and 66 of the Code. *See* 501 U.S. at __, 111 S. Ct. at 2640. Further, their functions and responsibilities, as fully reflected in the Chief Judge's

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[5] As the Chief Judge points out, *Buckley v. Valeo*, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1976), marked the first time that the Supreme Court used this approach of examining the functions and duties of a purported office to determine whether it was an Office of the United States. Prior to that decision, the approach was one that could fairly be characterized as rather circular: A position was an Office only if Congress required that the position be filled by the President, a Court of Law, or a Head of a Department. In other words, this "mode of appointment" approach essentially concluded that an Office was an Office when Congress *said* it was an Office by providing for appointment thereto consistent with the Appointments Clause. The functional-duty approach followed since *Buckley*, of course, is more consistent with the principle that even Congress cannot legislate in violation of the Appointments Clause, *see Freytag v. C.I.R., supra.*

opinion, 36 M.J. at 249-250, and prescribed in the statute and in the decisions of this Court, are leaps and bounds more than "ministerial tasks"; and "in the course of carrying out these important functions, [military judges] exercise significant discretion." 501 U.S. at __, 111 S. Ct. at 2640; *see* Criminal Law Note: *An Ongoing Trend: Expanding the Status and Power of the Military Judge*. The Army Lawyer 23 (Dept. of the Army Pamplet 27-50-239, October 1992). In my view, application of the Supreme Court's functional-duty analysis compels the conclusion that there is a distinct office of military judge.

The lead opinion concludes otherwise, after tracing the evolution of the law member to the law officers to the military judge. As to the final stage in this process, the plurality opines:

> The Military Justice Act of 1968 changed the title of the law officer to military judge, in order to increase his stature, and transferred more duties from the president of the court-martial to the military judge. *See* Art. 26, 82 Stat. 1336. *Since the Act merely transferred authority and duties from one official of the court-martial to another and renamed the law officer, it did not create a new office.*

36 M.J. at 229-230 (emphasis added). This casual view of the function and duties of military judges is not only demeaning; it is inaccurate.

First, the lead opinion itself acknowledges an incredibly important addition to the functions and discretion of the military judge over any other single official that previously sat at a court-martial: To sit, alone, as a court-martial and determine, alone, the issue of guilt and the sentence of a convicted accused in serious non-capital cases. This extraordinary power extends to convicting servicemembers of such serious felonies as murder and espionage and imposing any sentence other than death—including life im-

prisonment. Never before did any single member of the armed forces—the president of a court-martial or anyone else—have the statutory authority to perform this function.[6]

Second, the lead opinion omits to notice other important additions to the duties and responsibilities of a military judge that were not mere transfers from a president of a court-martial. For instance, prior to 1969, challenges for cause against a law officer or members of a court-martial were determined by the members collectively, *see* Arts. 41(a) and 51(b), UCMJ, 50 USC §§ 616(a) and 626(b) (1950), respectively, recodified as 10 USC §§ 841(a) and 851(b) (1956), respectively; by contrast, after 1969, a military judge rules finally on all such challenges, *see* Art. 41(a) (1968). Additionally, as footnote 6 of the Chief Judge's opinion makes clear, Congress was aware of other important duties that were given to a military judge that, before, had not rested with any single official, *e.g.*, " 'to rule finally on certain procedural matters, such as motions for findings of not guilty, on which he now may be overruled by the court members who are untrained in the law,' " and " 'for pretrial and postrial sessions to be held by the military judge without the presence of the court panel for the purpose of deciding procedural questions.' " In sum, the role of the military judge " 'will more closely approximate that of a civilian trial judge.' " *See* 114 Cong. Rec. 30564 (1968).

That is an *Office*.[7]. *See Freytag v. C.I.R.*, 111 S. Ct. at 2640. It is an Office that involves a full range and

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[6] The plurality's effort to minimize the remarkable nature of this change, by referring to the long history of "one-member" *summary* courts-martial, is off the mark. After all, the Supreme Court has held that a summary court-martial is *not even a criminal proceeding*. *Middendorf v. Henry*, 425 U.S. 25, 36-42, 96 S. Ct. 1281, 1288-91, 47 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1976).

[7] In determining this question of whether there is a distinct office, the lead opinion reflects significance in subtleties of wording of Arti-

collection of judicial functions and duties that, prior to 1969, did not repose in any other individual in the military justice system.[8] This factual analogy is consistent with

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cles 26 and 66, and, by comparison, 67, UCMJ, 10 USC §§ 826, 866, and 867, respectively. I simply make these observations about that exercise.

The Supreme Court in *Freytag v. C.I.R.*, *supra*, 111 S. Ct. at 2640, initially noted as a predicate that the office there was one "established by Law" and then followed the functional-duty approach and focused on the "duties and functions" delineated in the statute. As to whether Articles 26 and 66 as a predicate establish an office of military judge by law, a comparison of those provisions with the statutes in issue in *Freytag* ineluctably lead me to conclude that Articles 26 and 66 pass muster to do so. *Compare* 26 USC § 7443A-Special trial judges ("The chief judge [of the Tax Court] may, from time to time, appoint special trial judges who shall proceed under such rules and regulations as may be promulgated by the Tax Court." § 7443A(a)), *with* Article 1(10), UCMJ, 10 USC § 801(10) (" 'Military judge' means an official of a general or special court-martial detailed in accordance with section 826 of this title (article 26)."); Article 26(b) ("A military judge shall be detailed to each general court-martial."); and Article 66(a) ("Each Judge Advocate General shall establish a Court of Military Review which shall be composed of one or more panels, and each such panel shall be composed of not less than three appellate military judges.")

That predicate established, however, the real heart of the test relates to the nature and quality of the functions and duties of military judges delineated by those provisions; that inquiry is more fully addressed in my opinion, *supra*.

[8] The lead opinion points out that some of the functions and responsibilities that, after 1969, rest with the military judge earlier had been those collectively of the members of a court-martial. Without charting here the source of each of a military judge's duties, suffice to say that some earlier had belonged to members; some earlier had belonged to the president of a court-martial; and some earlier were non-existent—they were reposited for the first time in the office of military judge. Accordingly, I rhetorically ask the plurality: Does the fact that some (even assuming *most*, for this purpose) of the responsibility and discretion that now is lodged in *one* source actually came

the plain language of the UCMJ, which expressly defines the military judge as "an official." Art. 1(10) (1969).

At the appellate level, the functions and duties of military judges are similarly imposing. A Court of Military Review exercises "awesome, plenary . . . powers." *United States v. Cole*, 31 M.J. 270, 272 (CMA 1990). It is charged in every case it considers to "weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, and determine controverted questions of fact," and it may in a given case "affirm only such findings of guilty, and the sentence or such part or amount of the sentence, as it finds correct in law and fact and determines, on the basis of the entire record, should be approved." Art. 66(c).

In other words, appellate military judges sitting on a Court of Military Review in each case hear and decide all *legal* issues arising from the proceedings below, satisfy themselves that the evidence is *factually* sufficient to sustain the findings, assure that the sentence is *legally* imposable, and determine anew whether the sentence is an *appropriate* one. In addition to these functions during the usual course of appellate review of a court-martial conviction, Courts of Military Review possess and have exercised extraordinary-writ powers where appropriate. *See Dettinger v. United States*, 7 M.J. 216 (CMA 1979). *All* this is done without any second-guessing by any military superior and is subject to review only within the judicial system, by this Court.

By any view, in my opinion, these functions of military judges at the appellate level, like those of military judges at the trial level, are substantially "more than ministerial tasks"; rather, they reflect the exercise of "significant

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from *several various* sources in any way change the equation as to whether that *one* source now is an "office" under the functional-duty approach, *see* n.5, *supra*?

discretion" as well as *final* judgment subject only to judicial review by a superior appellate court. *See Freytag v. C.I.R.*, 501 U.S. at __, 111 S. Ct. at 2640. Just as surely as I said earlier about military judges at the trial level, these functions and duties of appellate military judges leave no doubt in my mind that Congress created an office of military judge.

III

Relying on *Shoemaker v. United States*, 147 U.S. 282, 13 S. Ct. 361, 37 L. Ed. 170 (1893), the plurality concludes that

> [a]ssuming, *arguendo*, that a new office was created at some time during the evolution of the military judge, the result is the same, because the duties of the military judge are the same as those traditionally performed by military officers serving as members of courts-martial. As such, they are germane to the duties of a legally trained military officer [detailed as a military judge].

Thus, the plurality reasons, a new appointment is not required. 36 M.J. at 246. I join the Chief Judge's reasoning in Part VI of his opinion that rejects both this reasoning and its reliance on *Shoemaker*.

Simply stated, *Shoemaker* was a situation in which the Supreme Court looked at the duties of two *particular*, high-level military engineers—the Chief of Engineers and the Engineer Commissioner for the District of Columbia—and concluded that the *additional* duties that Congress purported to give them as members of the Rock Creek Park Commission were germane to their particular offices, so that a second appointment was not necessary. That is a far cry from the extrapolation that the lead opinion now makes: That devolution of specific and

highly responsible judicial duties as a military judge is "germane" to some nebulous notion of duties of "legally trained military officers" in general. *Cf.* Criminal Law Note, *supra* at 259. Analogizing in reverse back to *Shoemaker*, what the plurality affirms here would be akin to concluding that the responsible and discretionary functions and duties of the commissioners on the Rock Creek Park Commission were "germane" to duties of *any* military officer trained as an engineer. *Shoemaker* may not be read that broadly.

Finally, I view two significant provisions in the Uniform Code of Military Justice as contradicting the plurality's conclusion that duties of a military judge are germane to the duties of a military officer. First, as Articles 26(b) and 66(a) expressly require that a military judge at both the trial and appellate levels be "a member of the bar of a Federal court or . . . of the highest court of a State," military authorities do not have complete control over whether a military officer meets the statutory qualifications to be a military judge. Admission to the practice of law is controlled or regulated by state statute, court rule, or both, and requires comprehensive legal training not provided by the military and a determination of legal competence by the civilian authority. *See* 7 Am Jur 2d, Attorneys At Law § 12; American Bar Association, Comprehensive Guide to Bar Admission Requirements (1992-93). Because a service-member's admission to the independent bar by civilian authority is a statutory qualification for a military judge, I cannot conclude that duties of a military judge are germane to the general duties of a military officer, even a "legally trained" one.

Second, as the lead opinion acknowledges, Article 66(a) authorizes appointment of *civilians* as appellate military judges on the Courts of Military Review. The plurality

purports to preclude the difficulty that this statutory provision creates with its germaneness theory, but it cannot be evaded. Whether civilians sat as judges in this case is not the point; rather, the pertinent inquiry is: What impact does this statutory authorization have on the interpretation of that statute as a whole relevant to whether the duties and functions of an appellate military judge are "germane" to duties generally of a military officer, even one "legally trained"? The express statutory provision for civilians on the appellate court is inconsistent with the plurality's germaneness theory. The plurality disregards this inconsistency; I cannot do so.

CONCLUSION

In summary, I conclude that Congress is not exempt from the strictures of the Appointments Clause of Article II, § 2, clause 2 of the Constitution when it exercises its powers under Article I, § 8, clause 14 of the Constitution to regulate the land and naval forces. *See Buckley v. Valeo*, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659. Considering the functions and duties of military judges. I conclude that Congress established a distinct office of military judge in Articles 26 and 66 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, so the Appointments Clause must be complied with in filling that office. *See Freytag v. C.I.R.*, 501 U.S. __, 115 L. Ed. 2d 764, 111 S. Ct. 2631. Finally, I conclude that a prior general appointment as a military officer will not satisfy the Appointments Clause in this regard because the specific judicial duties required of the office of military judge—as opposed to duty as a military officer—are not "germane" to duties of a "legally trained" military officer in general. *See Shoemaker v. United States*, 147 U.S. 282, 13 S. Ct. 361, 37 L. Ed. 170.

Because a majority of this Court, on the other hand, is of the view that the present method of appointing military

judges meets constitutional requirements, I need not decide whether these appointments can be affirmed under the *de facto*-appointee rationale of *Buckley*, as discussed by the Chief Judge. 36 M.J. at 256-257. I point out, though, that even that rationale has certain logical and legal limitations.[9]

APPENDIX D

RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE

10 U.S.C. § 806. Art. 6. Judge advocates and legal officers

(a) The assignment for duty of judge advocates of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard shall be made

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[9] The Chief Judge touches on some of these issues in Part VIII of his opinion in which he suggests the possibility of interim Presidential direction on appointments through the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the appropriate time for effecting statutory remedial action would be at issue. For instance, in implementing the *de-facto*-appointee rationale in *Buckley v. Valeo*, 424 U.S. at 142-43, 96 S. Ct. at 693, the Supreme Court stayed its judgment for a period of 30 days to afford Congress an opportunity to reconstitute the Federal Election Commission and, in the interim, allowed the commission to function *de facto*. Also, by analogy, in *Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.*, 458 U.S. 50, 102 S. Ct. 2858, 73 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1982), which involved a jurisdictional void created by a ruling that a system of bankruptcy courts was unconstitutional, the Supreme Court delayed its mandate for several months to permit Congress an opportunity to implement remedial action. After the initial delay, 458 U.S. at 88, 102 S. Ct. at 2880, the Court granted a further delay of some 2½ months. 459 U.S. 813, 103 S. Ct. 199, 74 L. Ed. 2d 160, 103 S. Ct. 200 (1982). *Cf. United States v. Matthews*, 16 M.J. 354 (CMA 1983) (in decision finding court-martial death-penalty sentencing procedures unconstitutional, mandate withheld for 90 days to allow opportunity to change those procedures in time for appellant's resentencing).

upon the recommendation of the Judge Advocate General of the armed force of which they are members. The assignment for duty of judge advocates of the Marine Corps shall be made by direction of the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The Judge Advocate General or senior members of his staff shall make frequent inspections in the field in supervision of the administration of military justice.

(b) Convening authorities shall at all times communicate directly with their staff judge advocates or legal officers in matters relating to the administration of military justice; and the staff judge advocate or legal officer of any command is entitled to communicate directly with the staff judge advocate or legal officer of a superior or subordinate command, or with the Judge Advocate General.

10 U.S.C. § 816. Art. 16. Courts-martial classified

The three kinds of courts-martial in each of the armed forces are—

(1) general courts-martial, consisting of—

(A) a military judge and not less than five members; or

(B) only a military judge, if before the court is assembled the accused, knowing the identity of the military judge and after consultation with defense counsel, requests orally on the record or in writing a court composed only of a military judge and the military judge approves;

(2) special courts-martial, consisting of—

(A) not less than three members; or

(B) a military judge and not less than three members; or

(C) only a military judge, if one has been detailed to the court, and the accused under the

same conditions as those prescribed in clause (1) (B) so requests; and

(3) summary courts-martial, consisting of one commissioned officer.

10 U.S.C. § 826. Art. 26, Military judge of a general or special court-martial

(a) A military judge shall be detailed to each general court-martial. Subject to regulations of the Secretary concerned, a military judge may be detailed to any special court-martial. The Secretary concerned shall prescribe regulations providing for the manner in which military judges are detailed for such courts-martial and for the persons who are authorized to detail military judges for such courts-martial. The military judge shall preside over each open session of the court-martial to which he has been detailed.

(b) A military judge shall be a commissioned officer of the armed forces who is a member of the bar of a Federal court or a member of the bar of the highest court of a State and who is certified to be qualified for duty as a military judge by the Judge Advocate General of the armed force of which such military judge is a member.

(c) The military judge of a general court-martial shall be designated by the Judge Advocate General, or his designee, of the armed force of which the military judge is a member for detail in accordance with regulations prescribed under subsection (a). Unless the court-martial was convened by the President or the Secretary concerned, neither the convening authority nor any member of his staff shall prepare or review any report concerning the effectiveness, fitness, or efficiency of the military judge so detailed, which relates to his performance of duty as a military judge. A commissioned officer who is certified to be qualified for duty as a military judge of a general court-martial may perform such duties only when he is assigned

and directly responsible to the Judge Advocate General, or his designee, of the armed force of which the military judge is a member and may perform duties of a judicial or nonjudicial nature other than those relating to his primary duty as a military judge of a general court-martial when such duties are assigned to him by or with the approval of that Judge Advocate General or his designee.

(d) No person is eligible to act as military judge in a case if he is the accuser or a witness for the prosecution or has acted as investigating officer or a counsel in the same case.

(e) The military judge of a court-martial may not consult with the members of the court except in the presence of the accused, trial counsel, and defense counsel, nor may he vote with the members of the court.

10 U.S.C. § 866. Art. 66. Review by Court of Military Review

(a) Each Judge Advocate General shall establish a Court of Military Review which shall be composed of one or more panels, and each such panel shall be composed of not less than three appellate military judges. For the purpose of reviewing court-martial cases, the court may sit in panels or as a whole in accordance with rules prescribed under subsection (f). Any decision of a panel may be reconsidered by the court sitting as a whole in accordance with such rules. Appellate military judges who are assigned to a Court of Military Review may be commissioned officers or civilians, each of whom must be a member of a bar of a Federal court or of the highest court of a State, The Judge Advocate General shall designate as chief judge one of the appellate military judges of the Court of Military Review established by him. The chief judge shall determine on which panels of the court the appellate judges assigned to the court will serve and which military judge assigned to the court will act as the senior judge on each panel.

* * *

(c) In a case referred to it, the Court of Military Review may act only with respect to the findings and sentence as approved by the convening authority. It may affirm only such findings of guilty, and the sentence or such part or amount of the sentence, as it finds correct in law and fact and determines, on the basis of the entire record, should be approved. In considering the record, it may weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, and determine controverted questions of fact, recognizing that the trial court saw and heard the witnesses.

* * *

(f) The Judge Advocates General shall prescribe uniform rules of procedure for Courts of Military Review and shall meet periodically to formulate policies and procedure in regard to review of court-martial cases in the offices of the Judge Advocates General and by Courts of Military Review.

(g) No member of a Court of Military Review shall be required, or on his own initiative be permitted, to prepare, approve, disapprove, review, or submit, with respect to any other member of the same or another Court of Military Review, an effectiveness, fitness, or efficiency report, or any other report or document used in whole or in part for the purpose of determining whether a member of the armed forces is qualified to be advanced in grade, or in determining the assignment or transfer of a member of the armed forces, or in determining whether a member of the armed forces should be retained on active duty.

APPENDIX E

RULE FOR COURTS-MARTIAL 1002, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 1984

CHAPTER X. SENTENCING

Rule 1002. Sentence determination

Subject to limitations in this Manual, the sentence to be adjudged is a matter within the discretion of the court-martial; except when a mandatory minimum sentence is prescribed by the code, a court-martial may adjudge any punishment authorized in this Manual, including the maximum punishment or any lesser punishment, or may adjudge a sentence of no punishment.

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